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1 Introduction
In contests, players expend effort or other resources to win a valuable prize. Examples
range from rent seeking (Congleton, Hillman and Konrad, 2008) and sports (Szyman-
ski, 2003) to competition for promotion and bonuses in firms (Lazear, 1995; Prendergast,
1999; Connelly et al., 2014). The key element of a simple contest game is the winner
determination process that can be characterized, in a reduced form, by a contest success
function (CSF) mapping a vector of players’ efforts into the winning probability for each
player. A contest is procedurally fair, or unbiased, if its CSF has the anonymity prop-
erty (Skaperdas, 1996): If the efforts of any two players are swapped, so will be their
probabilities of winning.
It is generally understood that unbiased contests are most effective, from the orga-
nizer’s perspective, when players are homogeneous in their ability. Thus, the literature
on biased contests, or contests with handicaps, studies how to bias a contest optimally
when the players are heterogeneous (e.g., Dukerich, Weigelt and Schotter, 1990; Schotter
and Weigelt, 1992; Fain, 2009; Epstein, Mealem and Nitzan, 2011; Franke, 2012; Franke
et al., 2013; Lee, 2013).1,2 In these and other papers on biased contests, specific tractable
contest models have been used and biases have been introduced in a number of ad hoc
ways.
In this paper, we systematically explore biased contests in a very general setting and
provide general results in the case of symmetric players. We introduce a class of biased
CSFs that includes as special cases the commonly used additive and multiplicative biases
but also allows for other types of biases. Our first contribution is to show that zero bias
is a critical point of a general objective function of the contest designer if and only if the
CSF belongs to this class. The general objective function includes as special cases the
aggregate effort, the winner’s effort, the winner’s ability and predictive power, i.e., the
probability that the highest ability player wins. In other words, the first derivative of
almost any objective function used in the literature with respect to the bias is zero at
zero bias under very general conditions.
The second contribution of the paper is to study whether a biased or an unbiased
1The idea of using handicaps to restore efficiency in tournaments of heterogeneous agents goes back
to Lazear and Rosen (1981) and O’Keeffe, Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1984); see also Tsoulouhas, Knoeber
and Agrawal (2007).
2In this paper, we focus on imperfectly discriminating contests with smooth contest success functions.
There is also a parallel literature using the all-pay auction model of contests, e.g., Lien (1990), Clark
and Riis (2000), Konrad (2002), Fu (2006), Feess, Muehlheusser and Walzl (2008), Li and Yu (2012),
Kirkegaard (2012, 2013).
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contest is optimal when players are symmetric and to show that biased contests are often
optimal.3 As an example, consider a Lazear and Rosen (1981) type tournament model
with two risk-neutral players i ∈ {1, 2} in which player i’s output (yi) is her effort (ei)
distorted by a zero-mean additive shock (ui): yi = ei + ui. Player i’s cost of effort is
2
3
e
3
2
i . The player with the highest output wins and receives the prize equal to 1, while the
other player receives zero. Similar to Meyer (1991), Konrad (2009), Ederer (2010) and
Brown and Minor (2014), assume that u1 − u2 is uniformly distributed on the interval
[−1
2
, 1
2
]. Bias β ≥ 0 favors player 1 by increasing her effort (at no cost) to (1 + β)e1 and
simultaneously decreasing player 2’s effort to (1− β)e2;4 the unbiased contest is obtained
at β = 0. Assuming an interior equilibrium (e∗1, e
∗
2), the first-order conditions for expected
payoff maximization for each player are 1+β =
√
e1 and 1−β = √e2. It is easy to see that
in this model the aggregate equilibrium effort is e∗1 + e
∗
2 = 2(β
2 + 1). While its derivative
with respect to β is zero at zero bias, the aggregate effort increases with the bias. The
intuition (confirmed formally in Section 4.1) is that the bias creates a mean-preserving
variation in the marginal benefit of effort across the players. Such variation then increases
(respectively, decreases) total effort if the marginal cost function is concave (respectively,
convex). As discussed below, this intuition is similar to the one arising in the literature
on dynamic contests.
Contests may also be used as selection mechanisms that are characterized by predictive
power, i.e., the probability to reveal the best player as the winner (Hvide and Kristiansen,
2003; Ryvkin and Ortmann, 2008). Continuing with the example from the previous
paragraph, suppose now that player i’s cost of effort is 2
3
tie
3
2
i , where ti > 0 is player i’s type.
Assume that the two players are symmetric ex ante but may be heterogeneous ex post,
with ti drawn independently for each player to be equal to tL or tH > tL with probabilities
1
2
. It is straightforward to show that in the interior equilibrium the predictive power of this
contest, defined as the probability that a player with type tL wins against a player with
type tH conditional on the players being heterogeneous ex post, is
1
2
+ (3β2 + 1)
t2H−t2L
t2H t
2
L
.5
Again, while its derivative is zero at zero bias, the predictive power increases with the
bias.
3A biased contest is automatically optimal for symmetric players whenever the CSF does not belong
to the class mentioned above. However, biased contests are also optimal for many CSFs in the class. In
this paper, we focus mainly on the CSFs in this class because it is for these CSFs that the zero bias is a
critical point for many objectives, and hence the optimality of biased contests for symmetric players is the
most counterintuitive. The class also happens to include the most popular CSFs used in the literature.
4Thus, the probability of player 1 winning is p(e1, e2;β) =
1
2 + (1 + β)e1 − (1− β)e2 for e1, e2 and β
such that this expression is between zero and one.
5As long as this expression is less than one.
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The second contribution of this paper is thus to show that the above examples are by
no means exceptional. We provide some general results and many examples showing that
it might be optimal to bias a contest in favor of one of the two symmetric players. Results
and examples include Tullock (1980) type contests and Lazear and Rosen (1981) type
tournaments; contests with players who are symmetric ex post or only ex ante; contests
in which players’ types are public or private information for the players. While in the
examples we focus on the two most popular objectives of the principal discussed in the
literature, maximization of aggregate effort and predictive power, some of our results
apply to other objectives such as maximization of the winner’s effort or of the winner’s
ability. In the model used in the examples above, both the winner’s ability and the
winner’s effort are also increasing with the bias. Our examples show that at least for
some parameterizations optimal biases in contests of symmetric players can be large and
lead to substantial improvements in the principal’s objectives.
The results of our paper are relevant in situations when one would like, or is insti-
tutionally obligated, to use biased contests but is concerned about their costs. Suppose
there is positive discrimination and hence, the contest designer has to favor some par-
ticipants over others. Our results can help the designer to turn this obligation to his or
her advantage and reach a better outcome in terms of essentially any possible objective.
Another application, as discussed below in more detail, is that of dynamic contests in
which it may seem fair, or is indeed customary, to favor those who had early success at
later stages. Our results can guide the contest designer to create a contest in which there
would be no trade-off between rewarding early success and generating subsequent perfor-
mance. In both cases, the contest designer effectively uses the institutional constraints
for introducing a bias that is hard to justify otherwise. Finally, our paper is important
from a methodological perspective in showing the limits of the “leveling the playing field”
and “competitive balance” ideas in the design of contests with asymmetric players.
The “common wisdom” prevailing in the literature that it is optimal not to bias the
contest when players are symmetric (and thus it is optimal to “level the playing field”
when players are different) has an obvious intuitive appeal. However, we believe that
it is based on a coincidence that this is true in the two specifications of biased contests
used most commonly in the literature: multiplicative bias in the Tullock contest (see
Epstein, Mealem and Nitzan, 2011; Franke, 2012; Franke et al., 2013) and additive bias
in the Lazear-Rosen tournament (see Dukerich, Weigelt and Schotter, 1990; Schotter and
Weigelt, 1992; Fain, 2009; Lee, 2013).6 We provide a general condition that gives these
6In the latter case it has been noted that zero bias is optimal only under the (most natural) assumption
4
two results as special cases for any effort cost functions. However, as soon as the bias is
introduced differently, for example, additively in the Tullock contest or multiplicatively
in the Lazear-Rosen tournament, the unbiased contest may no longer be optimal.
The two papers closest to ours are by Kawamura and Moreno de Barreda (2014) and
Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2015) who provide examples of optimal biased contests
when players are symmetric ex ante, both in the all-pay auction setting. Specifically,
Kawamura and Moreno de Barreda (2014) show that an additive bias may be optimal
when there are two types, public information and the principal’s objective is predictive
power. Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2015) also show that a bias in the form of player-
dependent prizes may be optimal in a setting with private information, continuum of types
and with the principal maximizing the sum of the winner’s type and effort. Our results
are much more general in that we allow for arbitrary (smooth) CSFs and ways the bias
is introduced. We also show that biased contests may be optimal even when players are
symmetric ex post, as in the example above. The rest of the literature on biased contests
(and all-pay auctions) studies how to bias contests when players are not symmetric ex
post and, when there are types, not symmetric ex ante.7
Our results are also related to models of dynamic contests (see Meyer, 1991, 1992;
Lizzeri, Meyer and Persico, 1999, 2002; Ho¨ﬄer and Sliwka, 2003; Aoyagi, 2010; Ederer,
2010).8 These models typically use a two-period tournament setting where the first-
period contest is unbiased. One major question is whether the first-period winner should
be favored in the second-period contest (see Meyer (1991, 1992) and, to some extent,
Ho¨ﬄer and Sliwka (2003)). A crucial observation there is that a small bias in the second
period leads to a second-order loss in the second period and to a first-order gain in the
first period and hence, is optimal. Our result that zero bias is a critical point in a very
general setting thus generalizes these papers to many CSFs, ways to introduce the bias
and objective functions. Our results on the optimality of biased contests imply that in
some cases there is no trade-off: Favoring the first-period winner in the second period
generates higher efforts in both the first and the second periods.
Another major question in the literature on dynamic contests is whether information
that the distribution of the difference of the noise terms is unimodal (see Lizzeri, Meyer and Persico, 1999;
Aoyagi, 2010).
7 Moroni (2015) shows that identical agents might not be treated in the same way. However, her setting
is very different from ours as she considers a dynamic contest with externalities and several “milestones.”
If one agent reaches a milestone, all other agents can work towards the next one. Then, at any moment,
each agent might prefer to wait until some other agent reaches the current milestone. Ex ante asymmetric
contracts reduce these free-riding incentives and might be optimal.
8We are grateful to Margaret Meyer for pointing to these connections.
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about who won the first-period contest (and by how much) should be disclosed, as in
Lizzeri, Meyer and Persico (1999, 2002), Aoyagi (2010) and Ederer (2010). These models
use the Lazear-Rosen tournament in which the performance of each player is the sum
of her efforts and noise terms over two periods. Therefore, if the players know their
first-period performance, the contest in the second period has effectively an additive bias
since one player has (generically) a higher performance in the first period. This creates a
variability of the second-period marginal benefit of efforts but does not change its average
by the law of iterated expectations. Thus, providing information increases total effort
if and only if the marginal cost is concave which is exactly the same result and a very
similar intuition as in our example above.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a general
model of a biased two-player contest and discuss properties of biased CSFs. In Section 3,
we show when zero bias is a critical point of an objective function of the contest designer.
In Section 4 we provide general conditions for when a biased contest is optimal. In Section
5, we provide examples of models and parameterizations for which unbiased contests of
symmetric players are not optimal. Section 6 provides an extension to the general case of
n ≥ 2 players. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are contained in Appendix A. Appendix B
contains the most general form of second-order conditions for two objectives – aggregate
effort and predictive power – and provides sufficient conditions for each to have a local
maximum or minimum when the contest is unbiased.
2 Biased contests
2.1 Model setup
There are two risk-neutral players and a risk-neutral principal. The players indexed
by i = 1, 2 compete in a contest by simultaneously exerting efforts ei ≥ 0. Player i’s
cost of effort is C(ei, ti), where ti > 0 is player i’s type; C(·, ·) is a thrice continuously
differentiable function with C1 ≥ 0, C11 ≥ 0 and C2 ≥ 0. The types are drawn from a
commonly known joint distribution F (t1, t2), which is symmetric, with F (t1, t2) = F (t2, t1)
for all (t1, t2) in its support.
The probability of player 1 winning the contest is given by a smooth contest success
function (CSF) p(e1, e2; β) with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, p1 ≥ 0, p2 ≤ 0. Parameter β characterizes the
bias in the contest.9 The winner of the contest receives a fixed prize normalized to one,
9We introduce players’ types through the effort cost function. Alternatively, types can be introduced
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while the other player receives zero prize. Each player’s payoff is her prize less her cost
of effort.
Definition 1 The contest is unbiased at β = β¯ if for all e1, e2 ≥ 0
p(e1, e2; β¯) = 1− p
(
e2, e1; β¯
)
. (1)
When the contest is unbiased, we obtain a standard symmetric CSF. Property (1) has
been called “perfect symmetry” by Dixit (1987) and “anonymity” by Skaperdas (1996).
In order to ensure that β is indeed a bias parameter and not just some parameter
the CSF depends on, we assume that there exists an open interval B such that β¯ ∈ B is
unique, and restrict attention to the values of β in this interval.10 Further, we assume that
for all admissible effort combinations (e1, e2) the derivative pβ(e1, e2; β) does not change
sign in B, i.e., an increase in the bias always benefits one of the players.11 Without loss
of generality, we can assume it benefits player 1, i.e., pβ(e1, e2; β) ≥ 0. This inequality
must be strict for at least some values of the arguments because otherwise β¯ would not
be unique.
In what follows, we consider two versions of the contest model that differ by the
structure of information about the players’ types (t1, t2). In the public information version,
types t1 and t2 are observable by both players, while in the private information version
each player i only observes her own type ti. In both cases, we assume that the principal
does not observe (t1, t2).
The principal’s choice variable is the bias parameter β, and her goal is maximization
of the objective
Q(β) =
∫
q(e1, t1; e2, t2; β)dF (t1, t2). (2)
Objective (2) is the expectation, over types, of a function q that may depend on the
equilibrium effort levels ei, types ti and bias parameter β. For example, q = e1 + e2 for a
directly into the CSF, which then becomes p(e1, t1; e2, t2;β), keeping the effort cost function the same for
all types (see, e.g., Meyer, 1991; Ho¨ﬄer and Sliwka, 2003; Ederer, 2010, in a Lazear-Rosen tournament
framework). All of our results can be reproduced in such a setting as well.
10This assumption excludes from consideration CSFs such as p(e1, e2;β) =
e1+β
e1+e2+2β
, which is unbiased
at any β. In this example, β is not a bias parameter. At the same time, CSFs such as p(e1, e2;β) =
e1+β−β3
e1+e2
are admissible even though it is unbiased for β¯ = −1, 0 and 1. Around each of these values of
β¯ there is an interval in which β¯ is unique.
11This assumption is not critical for the theory developed below; it is reasonable, however, because it
makes the interpretation of the bias more natural in applications. It excludes CSFs such as p(e1, e2;β) =
e1+β
2
e1+e2
, which is unbiased at β¯ = 0 but nonmonotonic in β in any interval around β¯.
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principal maximizing aggregate effort; q = p(e1, e2, β)I(t1 < t2)+[1−p(e1, e2, β)]I(t1 > t2)
for a principal maximizing the probability of the best player winning. Note that the
equilibrium effort levels ei may themselves be functions of ti and β, but we also allow for
explicit dependence on ti and β in q. For convenience, we assume that q is differentiable in
ei and β (see, however, the discussion after Example 3 in Section 3.3). Below, we impose
additional symmetry restrictions on q that ensure that objective (2) has a critical point
at β = β¯.
In the analysis below we rely heavily on the systems of first-order conditions for
equilibrium effort levels. Thus, we essentially restrict attention to interior pure strategy
equilibria. In general, multiple such equilibria can exist in the contest game, and in that
case the results apply to any such equilibrium. The results do not apply to mixed-strategy
equilibria and to equilibria with effort levels at the boundary of the domain of CSF p where
first-order conditions are not satisfied.
2.2 Properties of biased CSFs
Biased CSF p(e1, e2; β) represents an extended class of CSFs. Bias can be introduced
into a CSF in a variety of ways. Suppose p0(e1, e2) is an unbiased CSF satisfying the
anonymity property p0(e1, e2) = 1−p0(e2, e1). A biased CSF can be defined, for example,
with an additive bias as p(e1, e2; β) = p
0(e1 + β, e2), with β¯ = 0; or with a multiplicative
bias as p(e1, e2; β) = p
0(e1β, e2), with β ≥ 0 and β¯ = 1; or with a different form of
additive bias as p(e1, e2; β) = p
0(e1 + β, e2− β), with β¯ = 0. In this section, we introduce
a property of biased CSFs that we call locally symmetric bias. As we show below, this
property leads to a certain permutational symmetry in the dependence of equilibrium
efforts on the bias, which makes it equivalent, under additional symmetry restrictions on
the principal’s objective (2), to the point β = β¯ being a critical point of Q(β).
Definition 2 (Locally symmetric bias) Contest success function p(e1, e2; β) has a lo-
cally symmetric bias at β = β¯ if for all e1, e2 ≥ 0
p1β(e1, e2; β¯)− p2β(e2, e1; β¯) = 0. (3)
This condition can be interpreted as follows: p1β(e1, e2; β¯) is the marginal effect of
the bias on the marginal benefit of player 1’s effort. Similarly, −p2β(e2, e1; β¯) is the
marginal effect of the bias on the marginal benefit of player 2’s effort with the players’
efforts swapped. Thus, the locally symmetric bias condition (3) states that the total
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“symmetrized” marginal effect of the bias on the marginal benefit of the two players is
zero.12
It is straightforward to show via integration that the locally symmetric bias condition
(3) is equivalent to the condition,
pβ(e1, e2; β¯) = pβ(e2, e1; β¯), (4)
which is easier to check. However, for n > 2 players it is impossible to express (the
generalization of) (3) in a form similar to (4), see Section 6.
The locally symmetric bias condition (3) is ordinal, in the sense that it is invariant to
smooth monotonic transformations of the bias, as stated in the following straightforward
lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose p(e1, e2; β) is a biased CSF that is unbiased at β = β¯ ∈ B, τ : B → R
is a continuously differentiable strictly monotonic function, and β˜ = τ−1(β¯). Then,
(i) CSF p(e1, e2; τ(β)) is unbiased at β = β˜;
(ii) p(e1, e2; β) satisfies condition (3) at β = β¯ if and only if p(e1, e2; τ(β)) satisfies con-
dition (3) at β = β˜.
We conclude this Section by providing several examples of biased CSFs that have
the locally symmetric bias and those that do not. Checking condition (4) in each case is
straightforward.
Example 1 The following CSFs satisfy locally symmetric bias:
(i) Multiplicative bias in the Tullock contest: p (e1, e2; β) =
βer1
βer1+e
r
2
, r > 0;
(ii) Additive bias in the Tullock contest: p (e1, e2; β) =
er1+β
er1+e
r
2
;
(iii) Additive bias in the Lazear-Rosen tournament: p (e1, e2; β) = Pr{e1 + u1 + β ≥
e2 + u2}, where u1, u2 are zero-mean i.i.d. shocks;
(iv) Multiplicative bias in the Lazear-Rosen tournament: p (e1, e2; β) = Pr{(1 + β) e1+
u1 ≥ (1− β) e2 + u2}.
(v) The Tullock contest with a combination of biases: p(e1, e2; β) =
(1+β)er1+β
3
(1+β)er1+e
r
2
.
Example 2 The following CSFs do not satisfy locally symmetric bias:
(i) Another form of additive bias in the Tullock contest: p (e1, e2; β) =
er1+β
er1+β+e
r
2
;
12The swapping of efforts in the marginal effect for player 2 is a special case of cyclical permutation of
efforts that is part of the corresponding condition in the general case of n ≥ 2 players, see Section 6.
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(ii) Another form of multiplicative bias in the Lazear-Rosen tournament: p (e1, e2; β) =
Pr{βe1 + u1 ≥ e2 + u2};
(iii) A contest in which with probability β player 1 wins for sure and with probability
1 − β there is an unbiased contest: p (e1, e2; β) = β + (1− β) p0 (e1, e2), where p0 (e1, e2)
is symmetric, i.e., p0 (e1, e2) + p
0 (e2, e1) = 1.
3 Properties of unbiased contests
3.1 Public information contests
We start the analysis with the public information case where the players observe each
others’ types. The expected payoffs of players 1 and 2 are
pi1 = p (e1, e2; β)− C (e1, t1) , pi2 = 1− p (e1, e2; β)− C (e2, t2) .
In what follows, we assume that for all (t1, t2) in the support of F and for all β in some
open neighborhood of β¯ the contest has an equilibrium in pure strategies, e∗i (t1, t2; β),
i = 1, 2, that is characterized by the system of first-order conditions13
p1 (e1, e2; β) = C1 (e1, t1) , −p2 (e1, e2; β) = C1 (e2, t2) . (5)
When the contest is unbiased, swapping the players’ identities correspondingly swaps
the equilibrium effort levels, i.e., e∗1(t1, t2; β¯) = e
∗
2(t2, t1; β¯). The following lemma shows
that the local symmetry property of the CSF is necessary and sufficient for a zero total
change in the effort levels with respect to β.
Lemma 2 (i) Suppose contest success function p(e1, e2; β) has the locally symmetric bias.
Then in any equilibrium characterized above we have
e∗1β(t1, t2; β¯) = −e∗2β(t2, t1; β¯). (6)
13Thus, we require that the CSF p be “sufficiently concave” in e1. For example, for a Lazear and
Rosen (1981) type tournament model, this would imply a sufficiently large variance of additive noise;
for a Tullock (1980) type contest model, this would imply a sufficiently low discriminatory power of the
contest. An additional, complementary, requirement is that the effort cost function C be “sufficiently
convex” in effort.
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(ii) Suppose in any equilibrium characterized above we have
e∗1β(t1, t2; β¯) + e
∗
1β(t2, t1; β¯) = −e∗2β(t1, t2; β¯)− e∗2β(t2, t1; β¯). (7)
Then contest success function p has the locally symmetric bias.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 2 plays a key role in the proof of the equivalence of the locally symmetric bias
condition (3) and β = β¯ being the critical point of Q(β) in the case of public information
in Proposition 1 below. Indeed, it is seen immediately from (6) that, due to the symmetry
of the distribution of types F (t1, t2), β = β¯ is a critical point of the expected aggregate
effort QE(β) =
∫
[e∗1(t1, t2; β) + e
∗
2(t1, t2; β)]dF (t1, t2). For a general objective Q(β), cf.
(2), we have
Q′(β¯) =
∫
[qe1e
∗
1β(t1, t2, β¯) + qe2e
∗
2β(t1, t2, β¯) + qβ]dF (t1, t2),
and the result then follows provided function q(e1, t1; e2, t2; β) satisfies appropriate symme-
try restrictions that ensure that its derivatives qei are symmetric, and qβ is anti-symmetric,
with respect to a permutation of players (see Definition 3 below).
3.2 Private information contests
In this environment, each player i only observes her own type ti, and an equilibrium in
pure strategies has the form of bidding functions bi(t; β), i = 1, 2. Such an equilibrium
with non-increasing bidding functions exists under a wide range of conditions (Wasser,
2013; Ewerhart, 2014; Brookins and Ryvkin, 2015; He and Yannelis, 2015). As above, we
will assume that the equilibrium is characterized by the first-order conditions that in this
case take the form of a system of integral equations:∫
p1(b1(t; β), b2(t
′; β); β)dF (t′|t) = C1(b1(t; β), t), (8)
−
∫
p2(b1(t
′; β), b2(t; β); β)dF (t′|t) = C1(b2(t; β), t).
Here, F (t′|t) is the conditional distribution of cost parameters. At β = β¯ we have a
symmetric equilibrium with b1(t; β¯) = b2(t; β¯). The following lemma is the analog of
Lemma 2 for the case of private information.
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Lemma 3 Contest success function p(e1, e2; β) has the locally symmetric bias if and only
if in any equilibrium in pure strategies characterized above
b1β(t; β¯) = −b2β(t; β¯). (9)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 3 plays a key role in the proof of the equivalence of the locally symmetric
bias condition (3) and β = β¯ being the critical point of Q(β) in the case of private
information in Proposition 1 below. Similar to the case of public information, it is seen
immediately from (9) that β = β¯ is a critical point of the expected aggregate effort
QE(β) =
∫
[b1(t; β) + b2(t; β)]dF (t).
14 For a general objective Q(β) the result then follows
similarly to the case of public information as discussed after Lemma 2.
3.3 First-order conditions for maximization of principal’s objec-
tives
We now turn to analyzing the principal’s objective function Q defined by (2). The follow-
ing definition ensures that the objective is symmetric when the contest is unbiased and, if
it depends explicitly on β, the bias in the objective is locally symmetric in a way similar
to the local symmetry property of the CSF.
Definition 3 Objective Q(β) =
∫
q(e1, t1; e2, t2; β)dF is
(i) symmetric if q(e1, t1; e2, t2; β¯) = q(e2, t2; e1, t1; β¯);
(ii) locally symmetrically biased if qβ(e1, t1; e2, t2; β¯) = −qβ(e2, t2; e1, t1; β¯),
for all effort pairs e1, e2 ≥ 0 and types (t1, t2) in the support of F .
In what follows, for the sake of style and brevity, we will sometimes refer to β = β¯ as
“zero bias.”
Proposition 1 In both cases of public and private information, zero bias β = β¯ is a
critical point of any symmetric and locally symmetrically biased objective Q, i.e., Q′(β¯) =
0, if and only if the CSF p has a locally symmetric bias.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 is the central result of this section. It shows that for a large class of
objectives the first-order condition with respect to bias is satisfied by the unbiased contest.
The next obvious Corollary shows a simple way to find when a biased contest is optimal.
14Here, with a slight abuse of notation, F (t) denotes the marginal of F (t1, t2).
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Corollary 1 In both cases of public and private information, if the CSF p does not have
a locally symmetric bias, a biased contest is optimal for any symmetric and locally sym-
metrically biased objective Q.
Examples of principal’s objectives that satisfy the conditions of Proposition 1 and
Corollary 1 include the following.
Example 3 The following objectives satisfy Definition 3 when the CSF has a locally
symmetric bias:
(i) Aggregate effort: q = e1 + e2;
(ii) Predictive power: q = p(e1, e2; β)I(t1 < t2) + [1− p(e1, e2; β)]I(t1 > t2);
(iii) Expected ability of the winner: q = p(e1, e2; β)a(t1) + [1− p(e1, e2; β)]a(t2), where
ability a(·) decreases with the type, a′ < 0.
(iv) Winner’s expected effort: q = p(e1, e2; β)e1 + [1− p(e1, e2; β)]e2.
Aggregate effort is one of the most commonly studied objectives in the literature
on contests. Predictive power, or selection efficiency of a contest, is defined here as the
probability of the best player winning (Hvide and Kristiansen, 2003; Ryvkin and Ortmann,
2008). It is relevant in environments such as recruitment and promotion tournaments in
organizations or lobbying for public procurement. The expected ability of the winner
is relevant in similar environments (e.g., Ho¨ﬄer and Sliwka, 2003; Ryvkin, 2010). The
expected winner’s effort can emerge as an objective in R&D competition where the value
of the innovation that ends up being patented depends positively on the winner’s R&D
investment (Baye and Hoppe, 2003; Serena, 2015).
As mentioned in Section 2.1, we assume that q is differentiable in ei and β at β = β¯,
which is the case for most objectives typically used, cf. Example 3. If q is not differentiable
at β = β¯, then the notion of “critical point” has to be extended to situations when the
derivative Q′(β) is not defined. For example, consider a Tullock contest with an additive
bias, p(e1, e2; β) =
e1+β
e1+e2
, as in Example 1(ii), and suppose the principal’s objective is
maximal effort, q = max{e1, e2} (Denter and Sisak, 2015). When both players have effort
cost function c(e) = 1
2
e2, the equilibrium efforts are e∗1 =
1−β
2
and e∗2 =
1+β
2
, and q = 1+|β|
2
is not differentiable at β = 0, although Q(β) reaches the minimum there. In general,
however, our analysis does not apply to such cases.
Note that condition (ii) of Definition 3 and the requirement that the bias in CSF p
is locally symmetric are two independent conditions. In cases when objective Q does not
include p explicitly, such as in Example 3(i), locally symmetric bias is still necessary for
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Q to have a critical point at β¯. At the same time, when Q includes p condition (ii) of
Definition 3 is still necessary even if p has a locally symmetric bias. In Examples 3(ii)-(iv),
it is satisfied automatically provided p is locally symmetric, but this does not have to be
the case in general. An alternative, albeit less general approach, is to impose a structural
restriction on Q. The following definitions and corollary cover Examples 3(i)-(iv) and
provide a more intuitive alternative to Definition 3 and Proposition 1 in terms of the
primitives of Q.
Definition 4 Objective Q(β) =
∫
q(e1, t1; e2, t2; β)dF has the expectation form if there
are functions v and w such that
q(e1, t1; e2, t2; β) = p(e1, e2; β)v(e1, t1; e2, t2) + [1− p(e1, e2; β)]w(e1, t1; e2, t2).
Definition 5 Objective Q(β) =
∫
q(e1, t1; e2, t2; β)dF of the expectation form is symmet-
ric if for all e1, e2 ≥ 0 and for all (t1, t2) in the support of F
v(e1, t1; e2, t2) = w(e2, t2; e1, t1).
Corollary 2 In both cases of public and private information, zero bias β = β¯ is a critical
point of any symmetric objective Q of the expectation form, i.e., Q′(β¯) = 0, if and only if
the CSF p has a locally symmetric bias.
4 Optimality of biased contests
Proposition 1 establishes that zero bias β = β¯ is a critical point of essentially any reason-
able objective function. However, checking the second-order conditions is crucial since, as
this section shows, they are not satisfied in many cases. Hence, this section provides some
general results on when biased or unbiased contests are optimal. In particular, Section
4.1 considers the case when players are identical ex post and the contest designer max-
imizes the aggregate effort. Section 4.2 considers maximization of the aggregate effort
when players are identical ex ante and there are two possible types. Finally, Section 4.3
analyzes maximization of predictive power when CSF is linear in efforts.
In Appendix B we provide general conditions for when biased contests are optimal
for aggregate effort and predictive power, both under private and public information
(Propositions B1-B4). However, if no additional assumptions are made, they are very
complicated and hard to verify and interpret.
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4.1 Aggregate effort for ex post symmetric types
Here we consider the simplest case of ex post symmetric players, t1 = t2, and public
information. Note that, in general, the players’ types may still be random (i.e., not
observable by the principal), but it is assumed here that they are perfectly positively
correlated. Let c(ei) denote each player’s effort cost function, in which the identical cost
parameter argument is suppressed. The first-order conditions for equilibrium efforts (5)
take the form
p1(e1, e2; β) = c
′(e1), −p2(e1, e2; β) = c′(e2). (10)
The second-order conditions p11 − c′′(e1) < 0 and −p22 − c′′(e2) < 0 are assumed to
be satisfied in equilibrium. Let e∗ = e∗1 = e
∗
2 denote the symmetric solution of (10) for
β = β¯. Checking the sign of e∗1ββ + e
∗
2ββ at (e1, e2; β) = (e
∗, e∗, β¯) leads to the following
result.
Proposition 2 Consider the case of ex post symmetric players and public information.
Suppose p has the locally symmetric bias property. Aggregate effort is maximized in a
biased contest if
p1ββ − p2ββ > 2(e∗1β)2(c′′′ − p111 + 3p112) + 4e∗1β(p12β − p11β), (11)
where e∗1β =
p1β
c′′−p11 and all the functions are evaluated at (e1, e2; β) = (e
∗, e∗, β¯). If the
sign in (11) is reversed, then aggregate effort reaches a local maximum in the unbiased
contest.
Proof. See Appendix A.
While the exact interpretation of (11) is difficult, two points can be made. First, the
left-hand side of (11) is the rate of change in aggregate marginal benefits of efforts (see
(3) and its interpretation). When it is higher, it is more likely that (11) is satisfied and,
hence, a biased contest is optimal. Second, the right-hand side of (11) contains the third
derivative of the cost function. If it is positive, that is, the marginal costs are convex,
a spread in the marginal benefits of efforts decreases the total effort, other things being
equal. Then it is more likely that (11) is not satisfied and the unbiased contest is (locally)
optimal. Overall, however, since the bias affects the effort of each player directly and
through the change in the effort of the other player, all kinds of third derivatives of the
CSF enter condition (11).
In some examples, condition (11) is easy to check. There are two types of such
examples. First, when the CSF is linear or quadratic in efforts so that all or most of its
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third derivatives are zero. Consider the example from the Introduction where p(e1, e2; β) =
1
2
+(1+β)e1−(1−β)e2. All third derivatives are zero and (11) reduces to c′′′ < 0. Thus, as
we mentioned in the Introduction, the mean-preserving variation in the marginal benefit
of effort across the players created by the bias increases (respectively, decreases) total
effort if the marginal cost function is concave (respectively, convex).
A related (and even more striking) example is obtained if the bias is introduced as
p(e1, e2; β) =
1
2
+ βe1 − 1βe2. Since efforts enter linearly, all third derivatives of p on the
right-hand side of (11) are zero. Condition (11) then reduces to 1 > (e∗1β)
2c′′′. Concavity
of marginal costs is now sufficient but not necessary for the optimality of the biased
contest. Intuitively, the aggregate marginal benefit of effort, β + 1
β
, increases as the bias
moves further away from β¯ = 1 and hence, even if marginal costs of effort are slightly
convex, aggregate effort increases with the bias. Using explicit expressions for equilibrium
efforts it is easy to check that condition (11) is satisfied for any convex cost function of
the form c(e) = ez, z > 1. In other words, increasing aggregate marginal benefit of effort
dominates increasing marginal costs of effort and the optimal contest is always biased.15
The second type of examples in which condition (11) is easy to check is when e∗1β =
p1β = 0 at the equilibrium of the unbiased contest. Then, condition (11) reduces to
p1ββ− p2ββ > 0. Intuitively, e∗1β = 0 means that the bias has only a second-order effect on
equilibrium efforts and hence the equilibrium interdependence of efforts and a change in
the costs are negligible. The effect of the bias is then determined only by its effect on the
aggregate marginal benefits of efforts. In particular, the cost function has no influence on
the optimality of the (un)biased contest.
As a first example of this type, take the Tullock contest with the multiplicative bias
considered in Example 1(i).16 Then, p1β = re
r−1
1 e
r
2
er2−βer1
(er2+βer1)
3 which is zero at β¯ = 1 and
equal efforts. The aggregate marginal benefit of effort, p1 − p2 = 2re∗ β(1+β)2 , is concave in
the bias and p1ββ − p2ββ = −14 re∗ < 0 at β¯ = 1. The unbiased contest is (locally) optimal
for any cost function.
Another example of this type is a Lazear-Rosen tournament with additive bias con-
15Note that when efforts enter additively into the CSF, the optimal effort of each player does not depend
on the effort of the other player. Then, when there are types, optimal effort of each player depends only
on his or her type but not on the type of the other player. The cases of ex post identical players (or
equivalently, perfectly correlated types), ex ante identical players under public information, and ex ante
identical players under private information are all equivalent. In the simplest case of a CSF linear in
efforts, p(e1, e2;β) = γ1(β)e1 + γ2(β)e2 + γ(β), it is easy to see that Propositions 2, B1 and B2 all lead
to the condition p1ββ − p2ββ > 2(e∗1β)2C111 for the optimality of a biased contest.
16See also Section 5.1 for the analysis of this example when there are two types.
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sidered in Example 1(iii). Let G denote the cdf of the difference of the noise terms,
u2 − u1, and suppose the corresponding pdf g is differentiable. The CSF of this con-
test is p(e1, e2; β) = G(e1 − e2 + β), and the two first-order conditions (10) become
g(e1−e2+β) = c′(ei), i = 1, 2. Since g is symmetric around zero, g′(0) = 0, which implies
that at β¯ = 0 we have e∗1β =
p1β
c′′−p11 = 0 and condition (11) reduces to g
′′(0) > 0. Thus,
the optimal contest is biased for any cost function if g has an even number of peaks. If
g has an odd number of peaks, the (locally) optimal contest is always unbiased. If g is
unimodal, it is maximized at 0 and hence, the globally optimal contest is unbiased as has
been noted by Lizzeri, Meyer and Persico (1999) and Aoyagi (2010).
Finally, in some cases condition (11) just happens to be very simple. Take the Tullock
contest with the additive bias considered in Example 1(ii) with r = 1.17 It is easy to check
that p1ββ = p2ββ = 0, p11β = p12β and, at β = 0 and equal efforts, 3p112 − p111 = 0. Then,
condition (11) reduces to c′′′ < 0. As in the example in the Introduction (see above), the
optimality of an (un)biased contest is determined by the convexity or concavity of the
marginal cost function.
Effect of the bias on individual efforts
It may seem intuitive that the bias “encourages” player 1 and hence, increases his or her
effort, and “discourages” player 2 whose effort then decreases. However, this intuition may
be misleading for two reasons. First, the marginal benefit of each player’s effort depends,
in general, on the other player’s effort. A change in the bias changes both players’ efforts,
and the effect on their marginal benefits is ambiguous. The second reason is that, even
holding the other player’s effort fixed, the effect of the bias depends on how the bias is
introduced. For example, a multiplicative bias does increase the marginal benefit of player
1’s effort but an additive bias may decrease it.
To illustrate the ambiguous effect of the bias on individual efforts, we consider now
the three CSFs that we use in Section 5 below. In Section 5.1 we consider a Tullock
contest with a multiplicative bias, p (e1, e2; β) =
βe1
βe1+e2
, as in Example 1(i). When both
players have cost function c(e) = 1
2
e2, the equilibrium efforts are the same, e∗1 = e
∗
2 =
√
β
β+1
,
and decrease with the bias.
In Section 5.2 we consider a Tullock contest with an additive bias, p (e1, e2; β) =
e1+β
e1+e2
,
as in Example 1(ii). When both players have cost function c(e) = 1
2
e2, the equilibrium
efforts are e∗1 =
1−β
2
and e∗2 =
1+β
2
. Thus, player 1 exerts a lower effort than player 2,
17See also Section 5.2 for the analysis of this example when there are two types.
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and the difference increases with the bias. Note that the marginal benefits of efforts are
p1 =
e2−β
(e1+e2)2
and −p2 = e1+β(e1+e2)2 for players 1 and 2, respectively. Keeping the effort of the
other player constant, a higher bias decreases (increases) the marginal benefit of effort for
player 1 (player 2).
Finally, in Section 5.3 we consider a Lazear-Rosen tournament with a multiplicative
bias as in Example 1(iv). Denote by g the pdf of the difference in the noise terms, u1−u2.
The first-order conditions for the players’ equilibrium efforts are
(1 + β)g((1 + β)e1 − (1− β)e2) = c′(e1), (1− β)g((1 + β)e1 − (1− β)e2) = c′(e2),
which gives
c′(e∗1)
1+β
=
c′(e∗2)
1−β , and hence for β > 0 we have e
∗
1 > e
∗
2 in equilibrium.
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4.2 Aggregate effort for two correlated types
In this section we suppose that players are symmetric ex ante but may be asymmetric ex
post. As we will see, there is more scope for a biased contest to be optimal. Indeed, with
some probability players are different ex post. Then, with probability 1
2
the bias will favor
the stronger player and lead to a more lopsided competition than the unbiased contest,
while with probability 1
2
the bias will favor the weaker player and lead to a more leveled
contest than the unbiased one. It might be that the expected gain in the principal’s
objective from the latter will exceed the expected loss from the former. Thus, even if the
unbiased contest is optimal when the players are symmetric ex post, a biased contest may
be optimal when the types of players are not too positively correlated.
Consider the case of public information with two player types, tL < tH , such that
Pr(ti = tL) = 1−Pr(ti = tH) = λ, i = 1, 2, and Corr(t1, t2) = ρ. Let qij = Pr(t1 = ti, t2 =
tj), i, j ∈ {L,H}. Then
qLL = λ (1− (1− λ) (1− ρ)) , qHH = (1− λ) (1− λ (1− ρ)) ,
qLH = qHL = λ (1− λ) (1− ρ) .
Note that the restriction ρ ≥ max{− λ
1−λ ,−1−λλ } has to be satisfied in order for qLL and
qHH to be non-negative. Let Q
E(β;λ, ρ) denote the expected aggregate effort in the
18Note that if the bias is additive as in Example 1(iii), then the two players exert the same effort
characterized by the first-order condition g(β) = c′(e∗i ), i = 1, 2.
18
equilibrium for given values of parameters λ and ρ:
QE(β;λ, ρ) = qLL[e
∗
1(tL, tL; β) + e
∗
2(tL, tL; β)] + qHH [e
∗
1(tH , tH ; β) + e
∗
2(tH , tH ; β)]
+ qHL[e
∗
1(tH , tL; β) + e
∗
2(tH , tL; β) + e
∗
1(tL, tH ; β) + e
∗
2(tL, tH ; β)]. (12)
Differentiating (12) twice with respect to β and using the expressions for qij above,
we arrive at the following lemma.
Lemma 4 In a contest with public information and two correlated types, the second
derivative of aggregate effort at β = β¯ can be written in the form
QEββ(β¯;λ, ρ) = Q
E
ββ(β¯;λ, 1)− 2λ(1− λ)(1− ρ)
[
QEββ
(
β¯;
1
2
, 1
)
−QEββ
(
β¯;
1
2
,−1
)]
.
(13)
Proof. See Appendix A.
As seen from (13), QEββ(β¯;λ, ρ) is linear in ρ, which is expected since all probabilities qij
are linear in ρ. The interesting result of Lemma 4 is that the dependence of QEββ(β¯;λ, ρ)
on ρ is determined entirely by the two extreme cases – with perfectly positively and
negatively correlated types. When λ = 1
2
, (13) simplifies to
QEββ
(
β¯;
1
2
, ρ
)
=
1 + ρ
2
QEββ
(
β¯;
1
2
, 1
)
+
1− ρ
2
QEββ
(
β¯;
1
2
,−1
)
. (14)
When players have different types, the optimal contest is often biased andQEββ
(
β¯; 1
2
,−1) >
0. Then, by continuity (14) implies that the optimal contest is biased for ex ante sym-
metric players when ρ is negative enough. In other words, there exists a critical ρˆ such
that QEββ(β¯;
1
2
, ρ) > 0 for ρ ∈ [−1, ρˆ). By continuity, the same happens for values of λ
that are different but close enough to 1
2
.
Thus, even if under positive correlation between types the unbiased contest is optimal,
but under perfect negative correlation it is not then there is a range of negative correlations
for which a biased contest will be optimal. This is exactly what happens in the Tullock
contest with a multiplicative bias. As we know from Section 4.1, the unbiased contest
is optimal when players have the same types. However, as we will see in Section 5.1,
introducing a bias is optimal when the types are sufficiently negatively correlated.
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4.3 Predictive power for a CSF linear in efforts
Consider the case of a CSF linear in efforts, p(e1, e2; β) = γ1(β)e1 + γ2(β)e2 + γ(β).
The unbiasedness condition (1) implies that γ1(β¯) = −γ2(β¯), and locally symmetric bias
condition (3) implies that γ′1(β¯) = γ
′
2(β¯). We will explore the contest’s predictive power,
i.e., the probability that the winner is a player with a lower type, that we denote by
QS(β). Propositions B3 and B4 in Appendix B provide general expressions for the second
derivative QSββ(β¯) for the cases of public and private information, respectively. For the
CSF linear in effort they lead to the following Corollary.
Corollary 3 Suppose p(e1, e2; β) = γ1(β)e1 + γ2(β)e2 + γ(β) and p has the locally sym-
metric bias property. Predictive power is maximized in a biased contest under both public
and private information if for all t1 < t2 in the support of F
[4γ′1(β¯)
2 + γ1(β¯)(γ
′′
1 (β¯)− γ′′2 (β¯))]
[
1
C11(e∗1, t1)
− 1
C11(e∗2, t2)
]
(15)
+ 2γ1(β¯)γ
′
1(β¯)
2
[
C111(e
∗
2, t2)
C11(e∗2, t2)3
− C111(e
∗
1, t1)
C11(e∗1, t1)3
]
+ [γ′′1 (β¯)− γ′′2 (β¯)](e∗1 − e∗2) > 0.
If the sign in (15) is reversed, then predictive power reaches a local maximum in the
unbiased contest.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This condition is quite involved despite the CSF being linear in efforts. Indeed, a
higher bias increases the probability that player 1 wins for any configuration of types.
Take a pair of types (t1, t2), t1 < t2. Predictive power is proportional to the difference
between the probabilities of player 1 winning when the types are (t1, t2) and when they
are (t2, t1). Since both probabilities increase, the overall effect is ambiguous. The linearity
of the CSF in efforts implies that a higher bias increases player 1’s effort and decreases
player 2’s effort for any configuration of types. While this is a significant simplification,
the second-order condition still must involve the second derivatives of bias functions γi(β)
and equilibrium efforts leading to the second and third derivatives of the cost function
evaluated at two different points.19
An immediate observation from inspecting (15) is that the additive bias γ(β) does
not enter the expression. Indeed, an additive bias increases the probability that the first
19Another simplification brought about by the linearity in efforts, as we mentioned in fn. 15, is that
the effort of each player depends only on his or her type. Thus, whether the player knows the type of the
other player is irrelevant and the cases of public and private information coincide.
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player wins by the same amount whether he has a higher or a lower type and hence, does
not affect predictive power.
The first two terms in (15) come from the effect of the bias through changes in efforts
while the last term is the direct effect of the bias keeping the efforts fixed. Note that
e∗1 > e
∗
2 since t1 < t2 and γ
′′
1 (β¯) − γ′′2 (β¯) = p1ββ − p2ββ. Thus, the direct effect of convex
aggregate marginal benefit of efforts is to make it more likely that a biased contest is
optimal. For the case of multiplicative types, C(e, t) = tc(e), it can be easily shown that
1
C11(e∗1,t1)
− 1
C11(e∗2,t2)
> 0 if and only if c(e) exhibits increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA).
If this is the case, increasing the aggregate marginal benefit of efforts unambiguously helps
a biased contest to be optimal.
For some cost functions, condition (15) simplifies significantly. The simplest case is
when the cost function is exponential, C(e, t) = t(exp(e)−1). Then, C1(e, t) = C11(e, t) =
C111(e, t) and in the equilibrium C1(e
∗
1, t1) = C1(e
∗
2, t2) = γ1(β¯) at β = β¯. Condition (15)
reduces to γ′′1 (β¯)− γ′′2 (β¯) > 0.
Another simple case is that of the power cost function C(e, t) = 1
z
tez with z > 1.
Condition (15) becomes
2
z − 1
γ′1(β¯)
2
γ1
(
β¯
) + γ′′1 (β¯)− γ′′2 (β¯) > 0 (16)
The first term in (16) is positive since z > 1 and γ1(β) > 0, while the sign of
γ′′1 (β¯) − γ′′2 (β¯)) is ambiguous. For the example in the Introduction where p(e1, e2; β) =
1
2
+ (1 +β)e1− (1−β)e2 and hence, γ′′1 (β) = γ′′2 (β) = 0 this implies that predictive power
has a local minimum at zero bias for any z > 1. Take another example considered in
Section 4.1 in which p(e1, e2; β) =
1
2
+ βe1 − 1βe2. Then, γ′′1 (β) − γ′′2 (β) = 1β2 > 0 and
hence, predictive power is maximized in a biased contest for any z > 1 for this CSF as
well.
5 Examples
5.1 Example: Tullock contest, multiplicative bias
Consider the Tullock (1980) contest success function, p0(e1, e2) =
e1
e1+e2
, and introduce
the multiplicative bias as in Example 1(i): p (e1, e2; β) =
βe1
βe1+e2
. This CSF is unbiased at
β¯ = 1.
We already know from Section 4.1 that when the types are identical the optimal
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contest in this case is unbiased for any cost function. We will now find the conditions
under which the optimal contest is biased when there are two correlated types distributed
as in Section 4.2. Indeed, from previous work (see Franke et al. (2013) for the most
general treatment) we know that the optimal contest is biased when players are different
and have linear costs. Lemma 4 then implies that the optimal contest is biased when the
correlation between the two types is negative and sufficiently strong.
Consider the case of public information. The first-order conditions (5) write as
βe2
(βe1 + e2)
2 = t1,
βe1
(βe1 + e2)
2 = t2,
where t1 and t2 are the constant marginal costs of player 1 and 2, respectively. Thus,
e2
e1
= t1
t2
and the equilibrium effort levels are
e∗1 =
βt2
(t1 + βt2)
2 , e
∗
2 =
βt1
(t1 + βt2)
2 . (17)
When the two players have the same marginal costs t, e∗1 = e
∗
2 =
β
(1+β)2t
.
The expected aggregate effort is
QE (β) =
2β
(1 + β)2
(
qLL
tL
+
qHH
tH
)
+ β (tH + tL)
(
qHL
(tH + βtL)
2 +
qLH
(tL + βtH)
2
)
Then,
QEβ (β) = 2
1− β
(1 + β)3
(
qLL
tL
+
qHH
tH
)
+ (tH + tL)
(
qHL
tH − βtL
(tH + βtL)
3 + qLH
tL − βtH
(tL + βtH)
3
)
Note as an illustration of Proposition 1 that QEβ
(
β¯
)
= 0. Indeed, the first term is zero
and, given qLH = qHL, the second term is also zero.
The second derivative of QE(β) is
QEββ (β) = −4
2− β
(1 + β)4
(
qLL
tL
+
qHH
tH
)
+2 (tH + tL)
(
qHLtL
βtL − 2tH
(tH + βtL)
4 + qLHtH
βtH − 2tL
(tL + βtH)
4
)
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and at β = β¯, using qLH = qHL, it becomes
QEββ
(
β¯
)
= −1
4
(
qLL
tL
+
qHH
tH
)
+ 2qHL
t2H + t
2
L − 4tHtL
(tH + tL)
3
=
1
tL
(
−1
4
(
qLL +
qHH
h
)
+ 2qHL
h2 − 4h+ 1
(h+ 1)3
)
, (18)
where h = tH
tL
, a measure of heterogeneity between the two players. If (18) is positive, the
optimal contest is biased. Thus, h2 − 4h+ 1 > 0, that is, h > 2 +√3 is necessary for the
optimal contest to be biased. In Figure 1 we plot the region where (18) is positive and,
therefore, the optimal contest is biased.20
Figure 1: The region where the aggregate effort QE in a Tullock contest with a multiplicative
bias is not maximized at no bias. The cost function is C(e, t) = te; in the left figure ρ =
max{− λ1−λ ,−1−λλ } and in the right figure λ = 12 .
When the types are perfectly negatively correlated, there is a closed-form solution for
the optimal bias, as described in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 In the Tullock contest with multiplicative bias and perfectly negatively
correlated types, the optimal bias is β¯ = 1 (no bias) if h ≤ 2 + √3 and otherwise it is
20 When the information is private, there is no closed-form solution for equilibrium efforts and, thus,
the region where unbiased contest is not optimal cannot be determined analytically. However, numerical
examples are easily found with the same cost parameters and negative correlation strong enough.
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equal to
β̂ =
1
2h (h2 + 1)
((
h2 − 1)√(h2 + 4h+ 1) (h2 − 4h+ 1) + h4 − 6h2 + 1) .
Moreover, β̂ is strictly increasing in the heterogeneity between the players h.
In Figure 2 we plot the optimal bias and also the ratio of the total efforts in an
optimally biased contest and in an unbiased contest.
Figure 2: The optimal bias (left) and the ratio of the total efforts in an optimally biased contest
and in an unbiased contest (right).
5.2 Example: Tullock contest, additive bias
Consider the Tullock (1980) contest success function, p0(e1, e2) =
e1
e1+e2
and introduce the
additive bias as in Example 1(ii): p (e1, e2; β) =
e1+β
e1+e2
. This CSF is unbiased at β¯ = 0.
We already know from Section 4.1 that when the types are identical the optimal
contest is biased (unbiased) if C ′′′ < (>)0. Since, in general, there is no closed-form
solution for the equilibrium efforts unless C(e, t) is linear in e, we will now consider two
numerical examples with two uncorrelated types. In Figure 3, we plot the aggregate effort,
the winner’s effort (see Example 3(iv)) and predictive power (see Example 3(ii)), which
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becomes, in the case of public information with two types,
QS(β) =
1
2
[p (e∗1(tL, tH ; β), e
∗
2(tL, tH ; β); β) + 1− p (e∗1(tH , tL; β), e∗2(tH , tL; β))] . (19)
Figure 3: The expected aggregate effort (solid line) and the winner’s effort (dotted line) (left
scale) and the predictive power (dashed line, right scale) of a Tullock contest with an additive
bias and public information as a function of bias β. The parameters are tL = 2, tH = 4, λ =
1
2 ,
ρ = 0 and C (e, t) = 23 te
3
2 (left figure) and C (e, t) = 13 te
3 (right figure).
Under private information, predictive power takes the form
QS(β) =
1
2
[p (b1(tL; β), b2(tH ; β), β) + 1− p (b1(tH ; β), b2(tL; β))] , (20)
and the graphs are qualitatively similar. If the types are the same, the graphs for aggregate
and winner’s efforts are also qualitatively similar.
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5.3 Example: Lazear-Rosen tournament, multiplicative bias,
normally distributed noise difference
Take Lazear-Rosen tournament with multiplicative bias as in the example in the Intro-
duction and Example 1(iv) and suppose that u1 − u2 is distributed normally.21 There
is no closed-form solution for the equilibrium efforts. In Figure 4, we plot the aggregate
effort, the winner’s effort and predictive power (19) as functions of β for two different cost
functions.
Figure 4: The aggregate effort (solid line) and the winner’s effort (dotted line) (left scale) and
the predictive power (dashed line, right scale) of a Lazear-Rosen tournament with multiplicative
bias, u1−u2 ∼ Normal(0, 2) and public information as a function of bias β. The parameters are
tL = 1, tH = 2, λ =
1
2 , ρ = 0 and C(e, t) =
2
3 te
3
2 (left figure) and C(e, t) = 12 te
2 (right figure).
Note that for β ≥ 1 the second player does not exert any effort.
Under private information the graphs are qualitatively similar. If the types are the
same, the graphs for aggregate and winner’s efforts are also qualitatively similar.
21For the purposes of this example, we extend the definition of the CSF to allow for β > 1 (the case of
β < −1 is symmetric and can be treated similarly):
p (e1, e2;β) =
{
Pr{(1 + β)e1 + u1 ≥ (1− β)e2 + u2}, if |β| ≤ 1
Pr{(1 + β)e1 + u1 ≥ u2}, if β > 1
Clearly, for β ≥ 1 the equilibrium effort of player 2 is zero.
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5.4 Expected ability of the winner
To conclude this section, note that we have not said anything about the expected ability
of the winner, another possible goal of the contest organizer (see Example 3(iii)). The
reason is that when there are two types, tL < tH , it is an affine transformation of predictive
power. Indeed, let aL = a(tL), aH = a(tH), and rewrite the expected ability of the winner
in the case of private information as (the case of public information is similar)
p (b1 (tL; β) , b2 (tH ; β) ; β) aL + [1− p (b1 (tL; β) , b2 (tH ; β) ; β)] aH
+ p (b1 (tH ; β) , b2 (tL; β) ; β) aH + [1− p (b1 (tH ; β) , b2 (tL; β) ; β)] aL
= aL + aH + (aL − aH) [p (b1 (tL; β) , b2 (tH ; β) ; β)− p (b1 (tH ; β) , b2 (tL; β) ; β)] .
The last line is an affine transformation of predictive power, cf. (20). Thus, the effects
of the bias on predictive power and the expected ability of the winner are qualitatively
the same. In particular, as can be seen from Figures 3 and 4, in some cases bias increases
predictive power and, hence, the expected ability of the winner.
6 The general case of n ≥ 2 players
Most of our results readily extend to the case of an arbitrary number of players n ≥ 2.
Consider a contest defined by a family of biased CSFs pi(e1, . . . , en; β), i = 1, . . . , n, such
that
∑n
i=1 p
i = 1. Here, pi is the probability of player i winning the contest given the
vector of effort levels e = (e1, . . . , en) of all players, and β is the bias parameter. As before,
player i’s cost of effort is C(ei, ti), where ti is the player’s type. The joint distribution of
types F (t1, . . . , tn) is symmetric.
Let σij : Rn → Rn denote the swap operator such that if x′ = σij(x) then x′i = xj,
x′j = xi and x
′
k = xk for k 6= i, j.
Definition 6 (Generalized unbiased contest) The contest of n players is unbiased
at β = β¯ if
(i) for any i, j, pi(e; β¯) = pj(σij(e); β¯);
(ii) for any k 6= i, j, pk(e; β¯) = pk(σij(e); β¯).
The following definition provides a general form of the locally symmetric bias condition
(3).
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Definition 7 (Generalized locally symmetric bias) Contest success functions pi(e; β)
have locally symmetric bias at β = β¯ if for all admissible effort levels (e1, . . . , en)
p11β(e1, e2, . . . , en−1, en; β¯) + p
2
2β(en, e1, . . . , en−2, en−1; β¯)
+ p33β(en−1, en, e1, . . . , en−3, en−2; β¯) + . . .+ p
n
nβ(e2, e3, . . . , en, e1; β¯) = 0. (21)
Definition 7 states that the sum of the marginal effects of the bias on the marginal
benefits of players with cyclically permuted efforts must be zero.
Note that here and in the previous sections restricting the analysis to one bias pa-
rameter is without loss of generality. All the results also apply to CSFs with multiple
bias parameters (β1, . . . ; βm). Definition 6 would then be formulated for a vector of bias
parameters (β¯1, . . . , β¯m), and Definition 7 would be replaced by m equations for each bias
parameter.
Continue with our example from the Introduction. Suppose there are n ex post sym-
metric players, each with the same cost function 2
3
e
3
2
i . The CSF is biased in favor of the
first player. The bias increases the effort of the first player to (1 + β)e1 and reduces the
efforts of all other players to (1− β
n−1)ej, j ≥ 2, that is,
p1 (e1, . . . , en; β) =
1
n
+ (1 + β) e1 − 1
n− 1
(
1− β
n− 1
) n∑
i=2
ei,
pj (e1, . . . , en; β) =
1
n
+
(
1− β
n− 1
)
ej − 1 + β
n− 1e1 −
1
n− 1
(
1− β
n− 1
) n∑
i=2,i 6=j
ei, j ≥ 2,
provided all these expressions are between zero and one. It is easy to see that this CSF
has the generalized locally symmetric bias (21).
The equilibrium efforts are e∗1 = (1 + β)
2 and e∗j =
(
1− β
n−1
)2
, j ≥ 2. Hence, the
aggregate effort is
QE (β) = (1 + β)2 + (n− 1)
(
1− β
n− 1
)2
= n
(
1 +
β2
n− 1
)
,
which increases with β. At β = β¯ = 0 the first-order condition is satisfied and the
aggregate effort reaches its minimum.
We will now show how the generalized locally symmetric bias condition (21) is related
to the aggregate effort having a critical point at β = β¯.22 In this section, we restrict
22As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, it is then straightforward to extend the results to arbitrary
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attention to the case of public information. It is instructive to start with the simple case
of ex post symmetric types. As before, let e∗ denote the symmetric equilibrium effort at
β = β¯ and let c(ei) denote the cost function of effort.
Lemma 5 When players are ex post symmetric, the marginal effect of the bias on aggre-
gate equilibrium effort takes the form
n∑
i=1
e∗iβ =
∑n
i=1 p
i
iβ
(
e∗, ...e∗; β¯
)
c′′(e∗)− p111(e∗, . . . , e∗; β¯)− (n− 1)p112(e∗, . . . , e∗; β¯)
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 5 shows that for ex post symmetric players the marginal effect of the bias
on aggregate effort is proportional to the sum of the marginal effects of the bias on the
marginal benefits of players, and hence the generalized local symmetry condition (21) is
equivalent to β = β¯ being a critical point of aggregate effort.
Consider now the general case of n ex post asymmetric players. Let e∗i (t; β) denote the
equilibrium effort of player i in the contest given the vector of player types t = (t1, . . . , tn)
and the bias parameter β. The expected aggregate effort in the contest is QE(β) =∫ ∑
i e
∗(t, β)dF (t).
Proposition 4 In a biased contest of n players CSFs pi(e1, . . . ; β) satisfy the generalized
locally symmetric bias condition (21) if and only if QEβ (β¯) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided arguably the first systematic study of biased contests.
The first contribution of the paper is to introduce and characterize a class of biased CSFs
that includes as special cases the commonly used additive and multiplicative biases but
also allows for other types of biases. We show that exactly how a bias is introduced into
a CSF is crucial for zero bias to be a critical point of various principal’s objectives, i.e.,
for whether or not a small bias will have a first-order effect on each of the objectives.
Specifically, we identify necessary and sufficient conditions on the shape of a biased CSF
for a general class of symmetric objectives (that includes, but is not limited to, aggregate
symmetric objectives; see also the discussion after Lemma 2.
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effort, predictive power, expected effort of the winner or expected ability of the winner)
to have a zero first derivative with respect to the bias at zero bias. The conditions are
very general and are satisfied by most biased CSFs used in the literature.
The second contribution of the paper is to provide some general results and numerous
examples when biased contests are optimal when players are symmetric. Examples include
Tullock (1980) type contests and Lazear and Rosen (1981) type tournaments; contests
with players identical ex post or only ex ante; contests with public information and private
information; and the principal’s objective functions mentioned in the paragraph above.
One important type of contest models not covered by our analysis is all-pay auctions,
in which the CSF is not smooth. Such games have equilibria in mixed strategies under
complete information which are not linked directly to the pure strategy equilibria we
exploit in this paper. However, the pure strategy equilibria of all-pay auctions under
incomplete information are smooth bidding functions that can be viewed as the zero-
noise limit of equilibrium bidding functions from private information contests. Thus, our
analysis informs on the effect of biases in all-pay auctions of incomplete information with
arbitrarily small but nonzero noise. To what extent the results also apply to the limit of
zero-noise all-pay auctions is still an open question.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. Differentiate (5) with respect to β to obtain (omit arguments of
e∗iβ (t1, t2; β) and pij (e
∗
1(t1, t2; β), e
∗
2(t1, t2; β); β) for brevity)
p11e
∗
1β + p12e
∗
2β + p1β = C11 (e
∗
1, t1) e
∗
1β, (22)
−p12e∗1β − p22e∗2β − p2β = C11 (e∗2, t2) e∗2β.
Rewrite it as
[p11 − C11 (e∗1, t1)] e∗1β + p12e∗2β = −p1β,
p12e
∗
1β + [p22 + C11 (e
∗
2, t2)] e
∗
2β = −p2β.
Then,
e∗1β(t1, t2; β) = −
p1β [p22 + C11 (e
∗
2, t2)]− p2βp12
[p11 − C11 (e∗1, t1)] [p22 + C11 (e∗2, t2)]− p212
(23)
e∗2β(t1, t2; β) = −
p2β [p11 − C11 (e∗1, t1)]− p1βp12
[p11 − C11 (e∗1, t1)] [p22 + C11 (e∗2, t2)]− p212
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From now on, set β = β¯. Consider the symmetric cost pair, (t2, t1). At β = β¯, using (1),
rewrite (5) as
p1
(
e1, e2; β¯
)
= C1 (e1, t2) , p1
(
e2, e1; β¯
)
= C1 (e2, t1) . (24)
Note that the first of equations in (24) can be transformed into the second one by replacing
t1 with t2 and e1 with e2. This implies that equilibrium effort levels e
∗
1 and e
∗
2 have the
following symmetry:
e∗1
(
t1, t2; β¯
)
= e∗2
(
t2, t1; β¯
)
. (25)
We can derive e∗iβ (t2, t1; β) analogous to (23). Then, using (25), replace e
∗
1
(
t2, t1; β¯
)
and e∗2
(
t2, t1; β¯
)
with e∗2
(
t1, t2; β¯
)
and e∗1
(
t1, t2; β¯
)
, respectively, in the arguments of
pij. The resulting expressions are as in (23) but with all pij evaluated at the point(
e∗2(t1, t2; β¯), e
∗
1(t1, t2; β¯); β¯
)
, that is, with the reversed order of equilibrium efforts:
e∗1β
(
t2, t1, β¯
)
= − p˜1β [p˜22 + C11 (e
∗
1, t1)]− p˜2β p˜12
[p˜11 − C11 (e∗2, t2)] [p˜22 + C11 (e∗1, t1)]− p˜212
(26)
e∗2β
(
t2, t1; β¯
)
= − p˜2β [p˜11 − C11 (e
∗
2, t2)]− p˜1β p˜12
[p˜11 − C11 (e∗2, t2)] [p˜22 + C11 (e∗1, t1)]− p˜212
Here, p˜ij denotes pij(e
∗
2, e
∗
1; β¯), and the arguments of e
∗
i (t1, t2; β¯) are suppressed for brevity.
Differentiating (1) with respect to e1 twice and with respect to e1 and e2 obtain the
relationships
p11
(
e1, e2; β¯
)
= −p22
(
e2, e1; β¯
)
, p12
(
e1, e2; β¯
)
= −p12
(
e2, e1; β¯
)
, (27)
which imply, in particular, that in equilibrium
p11 = −p˜22, p22 = −p˜11, p12 = −p˜12. (28)
(i) Comparing the expressions for e∗1β(t1, t2; β¯) and e
∗
2β(t2, t1; β¯) in (23) and (26), re-
spectively, note that, due to conditions (27), the denominators are the same. Suppose
that p has a locally symmetric bias, i.e., pβ(e1, e2; β¯) = pβ(e2, e1; β¯), cf. (4). Differen-
tiating both sides with respect to e1 and setting e1 and e2 to the equilibrium efforts,
obtain p1β = p˜2β. Similarly, p2β = p˜1β. Comparing the numerators of e
∗
1β(t1, t2; β¯) and
e∗2β(t2, t1; β¯), note that they only differ by sign, which proves (6).
(ii) Suppose now that (7) is true. As shown above, the denominators of all four terms
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are equal, therefore the numerators should sum up to zero. The sum of the numerators
in (7) is (without the minus sign)
p1β [p22 + C11 (e
∗
2, t2)− p12] + p2β [p11 − C11 (e∗1, t1)− p12] (29)
+ p˜1β [p˜22 + C11 (e
∗
1, t1)− p˜12] + p˜2β [p˜11 − C11 (e∗2, t2)− p˜12] = 0.
Using (28) rewrite the last line of (29) as
p˜1β [−p11 + C11 (e∗1, t1) + p12] + p˜2β [−p22 − C11 (e∗2, t2) + p12] .
Finally, rewrite (29) as
(p1β − p˜2β) [p22 + C11 (e∗2, t2)− p12] + (p2β − p˜1β) [p11 − C11 (e∗1, t1)− p12] = 0. (30)
Note that (30) must be equal to zero for any (t1, t2) and an arbitrary function C
(provided that the equilibrium in pure strategies exists). Suppose C is quadratic in effort,
then C11 is a constant, and the only way for (30) to be zero for any (t1, t2) is to have
p1β = p˜2β and p2β = p˜1β for any (t1, t2). Thus, it must be that p1β(e1, e2; β¯) = p2β(e2, e1; β¯)
for any (e1, e2), i.e., (3) holds. Writing this expression as p1β(t, e2; β¯) = p2β(e2, t; β¯) and
integrating both parts over t from e2 to e1, obtain
pβ(e1, e2; β¯)− pβ(e2, e2; β¯) = pβ(e2, e1; β¯)− pβ(e2, e2; β¯),
which leads to (4).
Proof of Lemma 3. Differentiate both sides of equations (8) over β:∫
[p11(b1(t; β), b2(t
′; β); β)b1β(t; β) + p12(b1(t; β), b2(t′; β); β)b2β(t′; β)
+ p1β(b1(t; β), b2(t
′; β); β)]dF (t′|t) = C11(b1(t; β), t)b1β(t; β), (31)
−
∫
[p12(b1(t
′; β), b2(t; β); β)b1β(t′; β) + p22(b1(t′; β), b2(t; β); β)b2β(t; β)
+ p2β(b1(t
′; β), b2(t; β); β)]dF (t′|t) = C11(b2(t; β), t)b2β(t; β).
From this point on, set β = β¯. Recall that b1(t; β¯) = b2(t; β¯), p11(e1, e2; β¯) = −p22(e2, e1; β¯)
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and p12(e1, e2; β¯) = −p12(e2, e1; β¯). The system of equations (31) then gives∫
[p11(b1(t; β¯), b1(t
′; β¯); β¯)b1β(t; β¯) + p12(b1(t; β¯), b1(t′; β¯); β¯)b2β(t′; β¯)
+ p1β(b1(t; β¯), b1(t
′; β¯); β¯)]dF (t′|t) = C11(b1(t; β¯), t)b1β(t; β¯), (32)∫
[p12(b1(t; β¯), b1(t
′; β¯); β¯)b1β(t′; β¯) + p11(b1(t; β¯), b1(t′; β¯); β¯)b2β(t; β¯)
− p2β(b1(t′; β¯), b1(t; β¯); β¯)]dF (t′|t) = C11(b1(t; β¯), t)b2β(t; β¯).
Let y(t) ≡ b1β(t; β¯) + b2β(t; β¯). Adding the two equations (32), obtain the following
Fredholm integral equation of the second kind for function y(t):[
C11(b1(t; β¯), t)−
∫
p11(b1(t; β¯), b1(t
′; β¯); β¯)dF (t′|t)
]
y(t) (33)
=
∫
p12(b1(t; β¯), b1(t
′; β¯); β¯)y(t′)dF (t′|t)
+
∫
[p1β(b1(t; β¯), b1(t
′; β¯); β¯)− p2β(b1(t′; β¯), b1(t; β¯); β¯)]dF (t′|t).
(i) Suppose that p has locally symmetric bias, i.e., p1β(e1, e2; β¯) = p2β(e2, e1; β¯). Then
the last integral in (33) is zero, and y(t) = 0 is a solution of the resulting homogeneous
Fredholm equation. Although it is possible for the equation to have other solutions, those
would have to be eigenfunctions of the corresponding integral operator, which only exist
for very special configurations of parameters. The trivial solution y(t) = 0 is the only
“generic” solution that exists for arbitrary functions F and p. We conclude that if a pure
strategy equilibrium in the contest with private information exists for a measurable set
of parameterizations, it has to satisfy y(t) = 0.
(ii) Suppose now that y(t) = 0. This implies that the last integral in (33) has to be
zero for all distributions F . This is only possible if the integrand is identically zero for all
t and t′, i.e., p1β(e1, e2; β¯) = p2β(e2, e1; β¯) for all admissible effort levels e1 and e2, i.e., p
has a locally symmetric bias.
Proof of Proposition 1. Start with the case of public information. Differentiating
Q(β) over β and setting β = β¯, obtain
Q′(β¯) =
∫
[qe1(e
∗
1, t1; e
∗
2, t2; β¯)e
∗
1β(t1, t2; β¯) + qe2(e
∗
1, t1; e
∗
2, t2; β¯)e
∗
2β(t1, t2; β¯)
+ qβ(e
∗
1, t1; e
∗
2, t2; β¯)]dF (t1, t2).
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Function qβ is antisymmetric in (e1, t1; e2, t2) at β¯, and hence in equilibrium it is
also antisymmetric in (t1, t2); therefore, the last term integrates to zero. Swapping the
variables of integration in the second term and using the symmetry of q in (e1, t1; e2, t2),
obtain
Q′(β¯) =
∫
qe1(e
∗
1, t1; e
∗
2, t2; β¯)[e
∗
1β(t1, t2; β¯) + e
∗
2β(t2, t1; β¯)]dF (t1, t2).
Suppose p has a locally symmetric bias; then the expression in square brackets is equal
to zero due to part (i) of Lemma 2. Conversely, consider q = e1 + e2, which gives qe1 = 1
and
Q′(β¯) =
∫
[e∗1β(t1, t2; β¯) + e
∗
2β(t2, t1; β¯)]dF (t1, t2) = 0.
This implies that function e∗1β(t1, t2; β¯) + e
∗
2β(t2, t1; β¯) is antisymmetric in (t1, t2), i.e.,
condition (7) is satisfied, and part (ii) of Lemma 2 implies that p has a locally symmetric
bias.
Consider now the case of private information. The objective function is written as
Q(β) =
∫
q(b1(t1; β), b2(t2; β); β)dF (t1, t2).
Differentiating with respect to β and setting β = β¯, obtain
Q′(β¯) =
∫
[qe1(b1, t1; b2, t2; β¯)b1β(t1; β¯) + qe2(b1, e1; b2, t2; β¯)b2β(t2; β¯)
+ qβ(b1, t1; b2, t2; β¯)]dF (t1, t2).
Recall that b1(t; β¯) = b2(t; β¯). Due to property (ii) of Definition 3, function qβ at
β¯ is antisymmetric in (b1, t1; b2, t2); therefore, in equilibrium it is also antisymmetric
in (t1, t2), and the last term integrates to zero. Property (i) of Definition 3 implies
qe1(b1, t1; b2, t2; β¯) = qe2(b2, t2; b1, t1; β¯). Swapping the variables of integration in the sec-
ond term and using the symmetry of F obtain, similar to the case of public information,
Q′(β¯) =
∫
qe1(b1(t1; β¯), t1; b1(t2; β¯), t2; β¯)[b1β(t1; β¯) + b2β(t1; β¯)]dF (t1, t2).
Suppose p has a locally symmetric bias. Then the expression in square brackets is equal
to zero, due to Lemma 3. Conversely, suppose Q′(β¯) = 0 for any symmetric and locally
symmetrically biased objective Q. Consider the objective with q = e1 + e2, i.e., with
qe1 = 1. In this case, the integrand in the expression for Q
′(β¯) depends on t1 only, i.e., the
38
whole integral is equal to an integral of b1β(t; β¯) + b2β(t; β¯) over a positive measure, which
implies that (9) is satisfied and, by Lemma 3, the CSF has a locally symmetric bias.
Proof of Proposition 2. Differentiating both sides of each of the equations in (10)
with respect to β, obtain
p11e
∗
1β + p12e
∗
2β + p1β = c
′′(e∗1)e
∗
1β, −p12e∗1β − p22e∗2β − p2β = c′′(e∗2)e∗1β. (34)
At β = β¯ we have e∗1 = e
∗
2 and
p1 = −p2, p11 = −p22, p12 = 0, p111 = −p222, p112 = −p122. (35)
The first of the equations (34) then gives
e∗1β = −e∗2β =
p1β
c′′ − p11 . (36)
Since we assume that c′′ − p11 > 0, the sign of e∗iβ is determined by the sign of p1β.
Differentiating (34) with respect to β one more time, obtain
(p111e
∗
1β + p112e
∗
2β + p11β)e
∗
1β + p11e
∗
1ββ + (p112e
∗
1β + p122e
∗
2β + p12β)e
∗
2β + p12e
∗
2ββ
+ p11βe
∗
1β + p12βe
∗
2β + p1ββ = c
′′′(e∗1)(e
∗
1β)
2 + c′′(e∗1)e
∗
1ββ,
− (p112e∗1β + p122e∗2β + p12β)e∗1β − p12e∗1ββ − (p122e∗1β + p222e∗2β + p22β)e∗2β − p22e∗2ββ
− p12βe∗1β − p22βe∗2β − p2ββ = c′′′(e∗2)(e∗2β)2 + c′′(e∗2)e∗2ββ.
Now let β = β¯ (and, consequently, e∗1 = e
∗
2) and use the relations (35):
(p111e
∗
1β − p112e∗1β + 2p11β)e∗1β + p11e∗1ββ − (p112e∗1β + p112e∗1β + 2p12β)e∗1β + p1ββ
= c′′′(e∗1β)
2 + c′′e∗1ββ,
− (p112e∗1β + p112e∗1β + 2p12β)e∗1β + (−p112e∗1β + p111e∗1β + 2p22β)e∗1β + p11e∗2ββ − p2ββ
= c′′′(e∗1β)
2 + c′′e∗2ββ.
Adding the two equations, obtain
2(e∗1β)
2(p111 − 3p112 − c′′′) + 4e∗1β(p11β − p12β) + p1ββ − p2ββ = (e∗1ββ + e∗2ββ)(c′′ − p11).
Here, we used the fact that p11β = p22β due to the locally symmetric bias. Finally, using
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the expression (36) for e∗1β, obtain the result.
Proof of Lemma 4. The second derivative of QE(β;λ, ρ) at β = β¯ is
QEββ(β¯;λ, ρ) = qLL[e
∗
1ββ(tL, tL; β¯) + e
∗
2ββ(tL, tL; β¯)]
+ qHH [e
∗
1ββ(tH , tH ; β¯) + e
∗
2ββ(tH , tH ; β¯)]
+ qHL[e
∗
1ββ(tH , tL; β¯) + e
∗
2ββ(tH , tL; β¯) + e
∗
1ββ(tL, tH ; β¯) + e
∗
2ββ(tL, tH ; β¯)].
Using the expressions for qij, this can be written as
QEββ(β¯;λ, ρ) = λ[e
∗
1ββ(tL, tL; β¯) + e
∗
2ββ(tL, tL; β¯)]
+ (1− λ)[e∗1ββ(tH , tH ; β¯) + e∗2ββ(tH , tH ; β¯)]
− λ(1− λ)(1− ρ)[e∗1ββ(tL, tL; β¯) + e∗2ββ(tL, tL; β¯) + e∗1ββ(tH , tH ; β¯)
+ e∗2ββ(tH , tH ; β¯)− e∗1ββ(tH , tL; β¯)− e∗2ββ(tH , tL; β¯)− e∗1ββ(tL, tH ; β¯)
− e∗2ββ(tL, tH ; β¯)].
Note that only the last term depends on ρ. The first two terms combined represent
QEββ(β¯;λ, 1), whereas the expression in the square brackets in the last term can be rewrit-
ten in the form 2[QEββ
(
β¯; 1
2
, 1
)−QEββ (β¯; 12 ,−1)].
Proof of Lemma 5. The FOC for player i is
pii (e1, . . . , en; β) = c
′(ei).
Let e∗ denote the symmetric equilibrium effort at β = β¯. Differentiating the FOC with
respect to β and setting e1 = . . . = en = e
∗ and β = β¯, obtain (suppressing the arguments
for brevity)
n∑
j=1
piije
∗
jβ + p
i
iβ = c
′′(e∗)e∗iβ.
Summing these up for all the players get
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
piije
∗
jβ +
n∑
i=1
piiβ = c
′′(e∗)
n∑
i=1
e∗iβ.
Rewrite the first term as
∑n
j=1 e
∗
jβ
∑n
i=1 p
i
ij and note that
∑n
i=1 p
i
ij is the same for all j.
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Indeed, in the symmetric equilibrium we have
n∑
i=1
piij = p
i
ii +
∑
i 6=j
piij = p
1
11 + (n− 1)p112.
Then, expressing the sum
∑n
i=1 e
∗
iβ leads to the result.
Proof of Proposition 4. For the ease of exposition, we first prove the sufficiency result
for n = 3, then generalize it to an arbitrary n, and conclude with a proof of the necessity
result. For n = 3, the equilibrium we consider solves the system of FOCs
pii(e1, e2, e3; β) = C1(ei, ti), i = 1, 2, 3.
Let e∗i (t; β) denote the solution of this system of equations. The expected aggregate effort
is
QE(β) =
∫ ∑
i
e∗i (t; β)dF (t).
Differentiating the FOCs with respect to β and setting β = β¯ obtain the system of
equations
pii1e
∗
1β + p
i
i2e
∗
2β + p
i
i3e
∗
3β + p
i
iβ = C11(e
∗
i , ti), i = 1, 2, 3.
Let Ci11 ≡ C11(e∗i , ti). The system of equations above has the determinant
M =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p111 − C111 p112 p113
p212 p
2
22 − C211 p223
p313 p
3
23 p
3
33 − C311
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Let us first show that M is the same for all permutations of types t = (t1, t2, t3). It
is sufficient to show that it is the same for t and σ12(t). Note that at β = β¯ we
have e∗i (t; β¯) = e
∗
j(σij(t); β¯) and e
∗
k(t; β¯) = e
∗
k(σij(t); β¯) for k 6= i, j, which implies
e∗1(t1, t2, t3; β¯) = e
∗
2(t2, t1, t3; β¯) and e
∗
3(t1, t2, t3; β¯) = e
∗
3(t2, t1, t3; β¯). Abusing notation,
let e∗ = (e∗1, e
∗
2, e
∗
3) denote the vector of equilibrium efforts. Thus, a permutation of types
is equivalent to the corresponding permutation of efforts e∗ in the arguments of pi. For
the types (t2, t1, t3) this gives the determinant
M˜ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p111(σ12(e
∗); β¯)− C211 p112(σ12(e∗); β¯) p113(σ12(e∗); β¯)
p212(σ12(e
∗); β¯) p222(σ12(e
∗); β¯)− C111 p223(σ12(e∗); β¯)
p313(σ12(e
∗); β¯) p323(σ12(e
∗); β¯) p333(σ12(e
∗); β¯)− C311
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
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From the unbiasedness condition, we have p111(e2, e1, e3; β¯) = p
1
22(e1, e2, e3; β¯), p
1
12(e2, e1, e3; β¯) =
p212(e1, e2, e3; β¯), p
1
13(e2, e1, e3; β¯) = p
2
23(e1, e2, e3; β¯), p
3
13(e2, e1, e3; β¯) = p
3
23(e1, e2, e3; β¯) and
p333(e2, e1, e3; β¯) = p
3
33(e1, e2, e3; β¯). This gives
M˜ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p222(e
∗; β¯)− C211 p212(e∗; β¯) p223(e∗; β¯)
p112(e
∗; β¯) p111(e
∗; β¯)− C111 p113(e∗; β¯)
p323(e
∗; β¯) p313(e
∗; β¯) p333(e
∗; β¯)− C311
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
By swapping the first two rows and then the first two columns, determinant M˜ is trans-
formed into M , which implies that M˜ = M . More generally, this implies that the deter-
minant of the system of equations for e∗iβ is invariant to a permutation of types.
For brevity, let gi ≡ piii(e∗; β¯)− Ci11. Using Kramer’s rule, we can write
e∗iβ = −
M i
M
, M1 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p11β p
1
12 p
1
13
p22β g
2 p223
p33β p
3
23 g
3
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
M2 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
g1 p11β p
1
13
p212 p
2
2β p
2
23
p313 p
3
3β g
3
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ , M3 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
g1 p112 p
1
1β
p212 g
2 p22β
p313 p
3
23 p
3
3β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Further, using the symmetry of distribution F we can write
QEβ (β¯) = −
1
n!
∫
1
M
∑
s
[M1(s) +M2(s) +M3(s)]dF (s),
where the summation goes over all permutations s = (s1, s2, s3) of vector t and M
i(s)
denotes the determinant M i evaluated for the corresponding permutation.
Consider the sum over permutations in the equation above:
P = M1(t1, t2, t3) +M
2(t1, t2, t3) +M
3(t1, t2, t3)
+M1(t1, t3, t2) +M
2(t1, t3, t2) +M
3(t1, t3, t2)
+M1(t2, t1, t3) +M
2(t2, t1, t3) +M
3(t2, t1, t3)
+M1(t2, t3, t1) +M
2(t2, t3, t1) +M
3(t2, t3, t1)
+M1(t3, t1, t2) +M
2(t3, t1, t2) +M
3(t3, t1, t2)
+M1(t3, t2, t1) +M
2(t3, t2, t1) +M
3(t3, t2, t1).
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Note that M1(t1, t2, t3) = M
1(t1, t3, t2), M
2(t1, t2, t3) = M
1(t3, t2, t1) and M
3(t1, t2, t3) =
M3(t2, t1, t3). This gives
P = 2[M1(t1, t2, t3) +M
1(t2, t3, t1) +M
1(t3, t1, t2)
+M2(t1, t2, t3) +M
2(t2, t3, t1) +M
2(t3, t1, t2)
+M3(t1, t2, t3) +M
3(t2, t3, t1) +M
3(t3, t1, t2)].
We will find conditions for this sum to be equal to zero for any configuration of types.
This is equivalent to the requirement that the corresponding sum of determinants be equal
to zero for any admissible vector of efforts (e1, e2, e3). Consider the first three terms in
the sum above: ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p11β(e1, e2, e3; β¯) p
1
12(e1, e2, e3; β¯) p
1
13(e1, e2, e3; β¯)
p22β(e1, e2, e3; β¯) g
2(e1, e2, e3; β¯) p
2
23(e1, e2, e3; β¯)
p33β(e1, e2, e3; β¯) p
3
23(e1, e2, e3; β¯) g
3(e1, e2, e3; β¯)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p11β(e2, e3, e1; β¯) p
1
12(e2, e3, e1; β¯) p
1
13(e2, e3, e1; β¯)
p22β(e2, e3, e1; β¯) g
2(e2, e3, e1; β¯) p
2
23(e2, e3, e1; β¯)
p33β(e2, e3, e1; β¯) p
3
23(e2, e3, e1; β¯) g
3(e2, e3, e1; β¯)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p11β(e3, e1, e2; β¯) p
1
12(e3, e1, e2; β¯) p
1
13(e3, e1, e2; β¯)
p22β(e3, e1, e2; β¯) g
2(e3, e1, e2; β¯) p
2
23(e3, e1, e2; β¯)
p33β(e3, e1, e2; β¯) p
3
23(e3, e1, e2; β¯) g
3(e3, e1, e2; β¯)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Using the unbiasedness condition, the second and third determinants can be written with
gi and pijk as functions of (e1, e2, e3). Leaving out the arguments, obtain∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p11β(e1, e2, e3; β¯) p
1
12 p
1
13
p22β(e1, e2, e3; β¯) g
2 p223
p33β(e1, e2, e3; β¯) p
3
23 g
3
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p11β(e2, e3, e1; β¯) p
2
23 p
2
12
p22β(e2, e3, e1; β¯) g
3 p313
p33β(e2, e3, e1; β¯) p
1
13 g
1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p11β(e3, e1, e2; β¯) p
3
13 p
3
23
p22β(e3, e1, e2; β¯) g
1 p112
p33β(e3, e1, e2; β¯) p
2
12 g
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
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Using symmetry, obtain for the whole sum:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p11β(e1, e2, e3; β¯) p
1
12 p
1
13
p22β(e1, e2, e3; β¯) g
2 p223
p33β(e1, e2, e3; β¯) p
3
23 g
3
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p11β(e2, e3, e1; β¯) p
2
23 p
2
12
p22β(e2, e3, e1; β¯) g
3 p313
p33β(e2, e3, e1; β¯) p
1
13 g
1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p11β(e3, e1, e2; β¯) p
3
13 p
3
23
p22β(e3, e1, e2; β¯) g
1 p112
p33β(e3, e1, e2; β¯) p
2
12 g
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
g1 p11β(e1, e2, e3; β¯) p
1
13
p212 p
2
2β(e1, e2, e3; β¯) p
2
23
p313 p
3
3β(e1, e2, e3; β¯) g
3
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
g2 p11β(e2, e3, e1; β¯) p
2
12
p323 p
2
2β(e2, e3, e1; β¯) p
3
13
p112 p
3
3β(e2, e3, e1; β¯) g
1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
g3 p11β(e3, e1, e2; β¯) p
3
23
p113 p
2
2β(e3, e1, e2; β¯) p
1
12
p223 p
3
3β(e3, e1, e2; β¯) g
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
g1 p112 p
1
1β(e1, e2, e3; β¯)
p212 g
2 p22β(e1, e2, e3; β¯)
p313 p
3
23 p
3
3β(e1, e2, e3; β¯)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
g2 p223 p
1
1β(e2, e3, e1; β¯)
p323 g
3 p22β(e2, e3, e1; β¯)
p112 p
1
13 p
3
3β(e2, e3, e1; β¯)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
g3 p313 p
1
1β(e3, e1, e2; β¯)
p113 g
1 p22β(e3, e1, e2; β¯)
p123 p
2
23 p
3
3β(e3, e1, e2; β¯)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
We will now group the terms in the following way: 1+6+8, 2+4+9, 3+5+7. Terms
1, 6 and 8 combined produce∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p11β(e1, e2, e3; β¯) p
1
12 p
1
13
p22β(e1, e2, e3; β¯) g
2 p223
p33β(e1, e2, e3; β¯) p
3
23 g
3
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
g3 p11β(e3, e1, e2; β¯) p
3
23
p113 p
2
2β(e3, e1, e2; β¯) p
1
12
p223 p
3
3β(e3, e1, e2; β¯) g
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
g2 p223 p
1
1β(e2, e3, e1; β¯)
p323 g
3 p22β(e2, e3, e1; β¯)
p112 p
1
13 p
3
3β(e2, e3, e1; β¯)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (g2g3 − p223p323)[p11β(e1, e2, e3; β¯) + p22β(e3, e1, e2; β¯) + p33β(e2, e3, e1; β¯)] (37)
− (p112g3 − p113p323)[p22β(e1, e2, e3; β¯) + p33β(e3, e1, e2; β¯) + p11β(e2, e3, e1; β¯)]
+ (p112p
2
23 − g2p113)[p33β(e1, e2, e3; β¯) + p11β(e3, e1, e2; β¯) + p22β(e2, e3, e1; β¯)].
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Each of the expressions in square brackets is zero due to the locally symmetric bias
condition (21).
Consider now the case of arbitrary n ≥ 2. Similar to the special case above, write
e∗iβ = −M
i
M
, where M is a determinant with elements mij = p
i
ij−δijCi11, which is invariant
to permutations of types, and M i is the determinant M with the i-th column replaced by
vector (p11β, . . . , p
n
nβ)
T .
The derivative of expected aggregate effort can be written as a sum over all permu-
tations of types s:
QEβ (β¯) = −
1
n!
∫
1
M
∑
s
∑
i
M i(s)dF (s).
Notice that M i(t) does not change with permutations of t as long as the i-th component
of t stays fixed. Thus, for each i there are (n − 1)! identical terms in the sum that have
si = t1, (n− 1)! identical terms that have si = t2, etc. We can, therefore, use the cyclical
permutations of types to write the sum in the form
(n− 1)!
∑
i
[M i(t1, t2, . . . , tn) +M
i(tn, t1, . . . , tn−1) + . . .+M i(t2, . . . , tn, t1)].
The sum in the expression above contains n2 terms and can be divided into n groups of
n terms each, where the first group is
M1(t1, t2, . . . , tn) +M
2(tn, t1, . . . , tn−1) + . . .+Mn(t2, . . . , tn, t1),
the second group is
M1(tn, t1, . . . , tn−1) +M2(tn−1, tn, t1, . . . , tn−2) + . . .+Mn(t1, . . . , tn),
and the remaining groups are obtained by shifting the cyclical permutation one step
forward in each term of the previous group.
We will now show that each of these groups of terms is equal to zero under the locally
symmetric bias condition. Of course, it is sufficient to only prove this for one of the
groups; therefore, we will focus on the first group. Thus, we will show that condition (21)
implies
M1(t1, t2, . . . , tn) +M
2(tn, t1, . . . , tn−1) + . . .+Mn(t2, . . . , tn, t1) = 0. (38)
Notice that the minor of element p11β from M
1(t1, t2, . . . , tn) is the same as the minor
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of element p22β from M
2(tn, t1, . . . , tn−1). Indeed, element p11β is in the 11 position in
M1(t1, t2, . . . , tn), therefore its minor is the same as the 11 minor of M . Element p
2
2β is in
the 22 position in M2(tn, t1, . . . , tn−1), therefore its minor is the same as the 22 minor of M
evaluated at the permutation of types (tn, t1, . . . , tn−1). Recall that M is invariant under
permutations of types, and therefore so are the minors of its diagonal elements as long as
the permutation does not change the type corresponding to that element. Thus, the 22
minor of M evaluated at (tn, t1, . . . , tn−1) is the same as the 22 minor of M evaluated at
σ12(t), which is the same as the 11 minor of M evaluated at t.
Thus, we have shown that if we expand each determinant M i in (38) in the elements
of its i-th column, the coefficients on p11β in M
1, p22β in M
2, ..., on pnnβ in M
n are the same.
Similarly, it follows that the coefficients on p22β in M
1, p33β in M
2, ..., on p11β in M
n are
also the same, and so on. This implies that if condition (21) is satisfied then (38) is true.
In order to prove necessity, assume that QEβ (β¯) = 0 for all symmetric distributions of
types F . This implies that the symmetrized marginal effect of β on total effort is zero,
i.e.,
1
n!
∑
s
∑
i
e∗iβ(s; β¯) = 0,
where the summation goes over all permutations of the vector of types t. Recall that
e∗iβ(s; β¯) = −M
i(s)
M
, whereM is the same for all permutations of type, therefore
∑
s
∑
iM
i(s) =
0. As shown above, this implies that∑
i
[M i(t1, t2, . . . , tn) +M
i(tn, t1, . . . , tn−1) + . . .+M i(t2, . . . , tn, t1)]
= M1(t1, t2, . . . , tn) +M
2(tn, t1, . . . , tn−1) + . . .+Mn(t2, . . . , tn, t1)
+M1(tn, t1, . . . , tn−1) +M2(tn−1, tn, t1, . . . , tn−2) + . . .+Mn(t1, . . . , tn)
+ . . .
+M1(t2, . . . , tn, t1) +M
2(t1, t2, . . . , tn) + . . .+M
n(t3, . . . , tn, t1, t2) = 0.
Here, we split the sum into the same n groups following cyclical permutations of types as
described above. Each of these groups is a sum of terms like Ks
∑
i p
i
iβ where each p
i
iβ is
evaluated at one of the cyclical permutations of types, and coefficients Ks are determined
by the second derivatives piij and C
i
11 (through g
i), cf. Eq. (37). The whole sum must
equal zero for all configurations of types t, which are equivalent to arbitrary configurations
of efforts in the arguments of piij and C
i
11. Note that the terms with C
i
11 are only present
in the coefficients Ks. Thus, for the sum to be identically zero, a restriction would have
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to be imposed involving the cost function of effort. Without imposing such restrictions,
each of the coefficients Ks cannot be identically equal zero. Thus, the only way for the
sum to be equal to zero without imposing restrictions on the cost function is to require
that
∑
i p
i
iβ = 0 for all cyclical permutations of efforts.
Appendix B. Second-order conditions
In this section, we derive general second-order conditions for maximization of two most
popular objectives, expected aggregate effort and predictive power, under both public and
private information. In doing so, we do not impose any assumptions on the CSF (except
for locally symmetric bias) and distribution of types (except for its symmetry).
B1. Aggregate effort under public information
In the case of public information, define expected aggregate effort in the contest as
QE(β) =
∫
[e∗1(t1, t2; β) + e
∗
2(t1, t2; β)]dF (t1, t2),
where e∗i (t1, t2; β) are the equilibrium effort levels satisfying the system of equations (5).
The following proposition provides conditions under which expected aggregate effort
QE(β) has a local maximum or a local minimum at β = β¯.
Proposition B1 Suppose p has locally symmetric bias and the following condition is
satisfied for all types (t1, t2) in the support of F at β = β¯:
[C11(e
∗
2, t2) + p22 − p12](2A1 + p1ββ − p˜2ββ) < 0. (39)
Here, p˜2ββ ≡ p2ββ(e∗2, e∗1; β¯) and all other functions are evaluated at (e∗1, e∗2; β¯);
A1 = [p111e
∗
1β + p112e
∗
2β + 2p11β]e
∗
1β + [p112e
∗
1β + p122e
∗
2β + 2p12β]e
∗
2β − C111(e∗1, t1)(e∗1β)2,
e∗1β = D
−1[p1β(C11(e∗2, t2) + p22)− p12p2β],
e∗2β = −D−1[p2β(C11(e∗1, t1)− p11) + p12p1β],
D = [C11(e
∗
1, t1)− p11][C11(e∗2, t2) + p22] + p212. (40)
Then QE(β) has a local maximum at β = β¯. If the inequality in (39) is reversed, QE(β)
has a local minimum at β = β¯.
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Proof. The system of first-order conditions for equilibrium efforts is
p1(e1, e2; β) = C1(e1, t1), −p2(e1, e2; β) = C1(e2, t2).
Differentiating with respect to β, obtain
p11e
∗
1β + p12e
∗
2β + p1β = C11(e
∗
1, t1)e
∗
1β, −p12e∗1β − p22e∗2β − p2β = C11(e∗2, t2)e′2.
Rewriting the system of equations above as
[C11(e
∗
1, t1)− p11]e∗1β − p12e∗2β = p1β, p12e∗1β + [C11(e∗2, t2) + p22]e∗2β = −p2β,
and solving it for e∗1β and e
∗
1β, obtain the expressions given in the Proposition.
Differentiating with respect to β once more, and setting β = β¯, obtain
[p111e
∗
1β + p112e
∗
2β + p11β]e
∗
1β + p11e
∗
1ββ + [p112e
∗
1β + p122e
∗
2β + p12β]e
∗
2β + p12e
∗
2ββ
+p11βe
∗
1β + p12βe
∗
2β + p1ββ = C111(e
∗
1, t1)(e
∗
1β)
2 + C11(e
∗
1, t1)e
∗
1ββ,
−[p112e∗1β + p122e∗2β + p12β]e∗1β − p12e∗1ββ − [p122e∗1β + p222e∗2β + p22β]e∗2β − p22e∗2ββ
−p12βe∗1β − p22βe∗2β − p2ββ = C111(e∗2, t2)(e∗2β)2 + C11(e∗2, t2)e∗2ββ,
which can be rewritten as
[C11(e
∗
1, t1)− p11]e∗1ββ − p12e∗2ββ = A1 + p1ββ,
p12e
∗
1ββ + [C11(e
∗
2, t2) + p22]e
∗
2ββ = A2 − p2ββ,
where A1 is given in (40) and
A2 = −[p112e∗1β+p122e∗2β+2p12β]e∗1β−[p122e∗1β+p222e∗2β+2p22β]e∗2β−C111(e∗2, t2)(e∗2β)2. (41)
The determinant of the system of equations for e∗1ββ and e
∗
2ββ is D, the same as the
determinant of the system for e∗1β and e
∗
2β. Solving the system gives
e∗1ββ = D
−1[(C11(e∗2, t2) + p22)(A1 + p1ββ) + p12(A2 − p2ββ)], (42)
e∗2ββ = D
−1[(C11(e∗1, t1)− p11)(A2 − p2ββ)− p12(A1 + p1ββ)],
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and
D(e∗1ββ + e
∗
2ββ) = [C11(e
∗
2, t2) + p22 − p12](A1 + p1ββ) + [C11(e∗1, t1)− p11 + p12](A2 − p2ββ).
Thus,
QEββ(β¯) =
∫
(e∗1ββ + e
∗
2ββ)dF (t1, t2) =
∫
D−1[C11(e∗2, t2) + p22 − p12](A1 + p1ββ)dF (t1, t2)
+
∫
D−1[C11(e∗1, t1)− p11 + p12](A2 − p2ββ)dF (t1, t2).
Using the symmetry of distribution F , we now swap the variables of integration (t1, t2)
in the second integral, which is equivalent to swapping equilibrium efforts e∗1 and e
∗
2 in
the arguments of all functions. Note that D is invariant under such a swap, whereas the
expression in the square brackets becomes the same as in the first integral and, due to
the locally symmetric bias condition, A2 becomes A1. This gives
QEββ(β¯) =
∫
D−1[C11(e∗2, t2) + p22 − p12](A1 + p1ββ)dF (t1, t2)
+
∫
D−1[C11(e∗2, t2) + p22 − p12](A1 − p˜2ββ)dF (t1, t2)
=
∫
D−1[C11(e∗2, t2) + p22 − p12](2A1 + p1ββ − p˜2ββ)dF (t1, t2).
Because D > 0 due to the second-order conditions for the equilibrium, the result follows.
B2. Aggregate effort under private information
In the case of private information, expected aggregate effort is defined as
QE(β) =
∫
[b1(t; β) + b2(t; β)]dF (t),
where bi(t; β) are the equilibrium bidding functions satisfying the system of integral equa-
tions (8).
The following proposition provides conditions under which expected aggregate effort
QE(β) has a local maximum or a local minimum at β = β¯.
Proposition B2 Suppose p has locally symmetric bias and z(t) is a solution of the fol-
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lowing integral equation:[
C11(b1(t; β¯), t)−
∫
p11(b1(t; β¯), b1(t
′; β¯); β¯)dF (t′|t)
]
z(t) (43)
=
∫
p12(b1(t; β¯), b1(t
′; β¯); β¯)z(t′)dF (t′|t) +B(t),
where
B(t) = −2C111(b1(t; β¯), t)b21β(t; β¯) +
∫
[2(p111b1β(t; β¯) + p112b2β(t
′; β¯) + 2p11β)b1β(t; β¯)
+ 2(p112b1β(t; β¯) + p122b2β(t
′; β¯) + 2p12β)b2β(t′; β¯) + p1ββ − p˜2ββ]dF (t′|t),
with p˜2ββ ≡ p2ββ(b1(t′; β¯), b1(t; β¯); β¯) and all other derivatives of p evaluated at (b1(t; β¯), b1(t′; β¯); β¯).
Then QE(β) has a local maximum (respectively, local minimum) at β = β¯ if z(t) is
negative (respectively, positive) for all t.
Proof. Differentiating (8) over β twice and setting β = β¯ obtain∫
[(p111b1β + p112b
′
2β + p11β)b1β + p11b1ββ + (p112b1β + p122b
′
2β + p12β)b
′
2β + p12b
′
2ββ
+ p11βb1β + p12βb
′
2β + p1ββ]dF (t
′|t) = C111(b1, t)b21β + C11(b1, t)b1ββ,
−
∫
[(p′112b
′
1β + p
′
122b2β + p
′
12β)b
′
1β + p
′
12b
′
1ββ + (p
′
122b
′
1β + p
′
222b2β + p
′
22β)b2β + p
′
22b2ββ
+ p′12βb
′
1β + p
′
22βb2β + p
′
2ββ]dF (t
′|t) = C111(b2, t)b22β + C11(b2, t)b2ββ.
Here, pij and pijk are evaluated at (b1(t; β¯), b2(t
′; β¯); β¯) whereas p′ij and p
′
ijk are evaluated
at (b1(t
′; β¯), b2(t; β¯); β¯). Similarly, biβ and biββ are evaluated at (t; β¯) while b′iβ and b
′
iββ
are evaluated at (t′; β¯).
Introduce z(t) = b1ββ(t; β¯)+b2ββ(t; β¯). Recall that when p has a locally symmetric bias
we have b1(t; β¯) = b2(t; β¯), b1β(t; β¯) = −b2β(t; β¯). This implies p′12 = −p12, p′22 = −p11,
p′112 = −p122, etc. Transforming the second equation, and summing up the two equations,
obtain the integral equation (43).
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B3. Predictive power under public information
The predictive power, i.e., the probability that the best player wins the contest (cf. Ex-
ample 3(ii)), is equal to
QS(β) =
∫
t1<t2
p(e∗1, e
∗
2; β)dF (t1, t2) +
∫
t1>t2
[1− p(e∗1, e∗2; β)]dF (t1, t2). (44)
Here, integration in the first (respectively, second) term is over the set of types (t1, t2)
such that t1 < t2 (respectively, t1 > t2) and e
∗
i ≡ e∗i (t1, t2; β) are the equilibrium effort
levels.
The following proposition provides conditions for β¯ to be a local maximum or mini-
mum of predictive power QS(β).
Proposition B3 Suppose p has locally symmetric bias and the following condition holds
for all t1 < t2 in the support of F :
2(p11e
∗
1β + p12e
∗
2β + 2p1β)e
∗
1β + 2(p12e
∗
1β + p22e
∗
2β + 2p2β)e
∗
2β
+ p1(e
∗
1ββ + e˜
∗
2ββ) + p2(e˜
∗
1ββ + e
∗
2ββ) + pββ − p˜ββ < 0,
where e∗1β and e
∗
2β are as in Proposition B1, e
∗
1ββ and e
∗
2ββ are given by (42), e˜
∗
iββ and p˜ββ
are evaluated at (e∗2, e
∗
1; β¯), and all other functions are evaluated at (e
∗
1, e
∗
2; β¯).
Then QS(β) has a local maximum at β = β¯. If the inequality is reversed, QS(β) has
a local minimum at β = β¯.
Proof. Differentiating (44) over β and omitting the arguments of all functions for brevity,
obtain
QSβ(β) =
∫
t1<t2
(p1e
∗
1β + p2e
∗
2β + pβ)dF −
∫
t1>t2
(p1e
∗
1β + p2e
∗
2β + pβ)dF.
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Differentiating over β once more and setting β = β¯, obtain
QSββ(β¯) =
∫
t1<t2
[(p11e
∗
1β + p12e
∗
2β + p1β)e
∗
1β + p1e
∗
1ββ + (p12e
∗
1β + p22e
∗
2β + p2β)e
∗
2β
+ p2e
∗
2ββ + p1βe
∗
1β + p2βe
∗
2β + pββ]dF −
∫
t1>t2
[same expression]dF
=
∫
t1<t2
[(p11e
∗
1β + p12e
∗
2β + 2p1β)e
∗
1β + (p12e
∗
1β + p22e
∗
2β + 2p2β)e
∗
2β
+ p1e
∗
1ββ + p2e
∗
1ββ + pββ]dF −
∫
t1>t2
[same expression]dF.
Now, using the symmetry of F , swap the variables of integration in the second integral.
Recall that p11 = −p˜22, p1 = −p˜2, p12 = −p˜12, and locally symmetric bias implies
e∗1β = −e˜∗2β and p1β = p˜2β. This gives
QSββ(β¯) =
∫
t1<t2
[2(p11e
∗
1β + p12e
∗
2β + 2p1β)e
∗
1β + 2(p12e
∗
1β + p22e
∗
2β + 2p2β)e
∗
2β
+ p1(e
∗
1ββ + e˜
∗
2ββ) + p2(e˜
∗
1ββ + e
∗
2ββ) + pββ − p˜ββ]dF,
and the result follows.
The conditions of Proposition B3 simplify substantially when p is linear in effort, i.e.,
it takes the form p(e1, e2; β) = γ1(β)e1 + γ2(β)e2 + γ(β). The results are summarized in
Corollary 3.
Proof of Corollary 3. Here we prove the case of public information. For the case of
private information see Corollary 4.
When p is linear in e1 and e2, all second- and third-order partial derivatives of p with
respect to effort are zero. The unbiasedness condition (1) implies that γ1(β¯) = −γ2(β¯),
and locally symmetric bias condition (3) implies that γ′1(β¯) = γ
′
2(β¯). The expressions for
A1, A2, D, e
∗
iβ and e
∗
iββ from Propositions B1 and B3 are now simplified as follows:
D = C11(e
∗
1, t1)C11(e
∗
2, t2), e
∗
1β =
γ′1(β¯)
C11(e∗1, t1)
, e∗2β = −
γ′1(β¯)
C11(e∗2, t2)
,
A1 = −C111(e
∗
1, t1)γ
′
1(β¯)
2
C11(e∗1, t1)2
, A2 = −C111(e
∗
2, t2)γ
′
1(β¯)
2
C11(e∗2, t2)2
,
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e∗1ββ =
A1 + p1ββ
C11(e∗1, t1)
=
1
C11(e∗1, t1)
[
γ′′1 (β¯)−
C111(e
∗
1, t1)γ
′
1(β¯)
2
C11(e∗1, t1)2
]
,
e∗2ββ =
A2 − p2ββ
C11(e∗2, t2)
= − 1
C11(e∗2, t2)
[
γ′′2 (β¯) +
C111(e
∗
2, t2)γ
′
1(β¯)
2
C11(e∗2, t2)2
]
.
The criterion from Proposition B3 then becomes
4p1βe
∗
1β + 4p2βe
∗
2β + p1(e
∗
1ββ + e˜
∗
2ββ) + p2(e˜
∗
1ββ + e
∗
2ββ) + pββ − p˜ββ
= 4γ′1(β¯)
2
[
1
C11(e∗1, t1)
− 1
C11(e∗2, t2)
]
+ γ1(β¯)
[
γ′′1 (β¯)
C11(e∗1, t1)
− C111(e
∗
1, t1)γ
′
1(β¯)
2
C11(e∗1, t1)3
− γ
′′
1 (β¯)
C11(e∗2, t2)
+
C111(e
∗
2, t2)γ
′
1(β¯)
2
C11(e∗2, t2)3
− γ
′′
2 (β¯)
C11(e∗1, t1)
− C111(e
∗
1, t1)γ
′
1(β¯)
2
C11(e∗1, t1)3
+
γ′′2 (β¯)
C11(e∗2, t2)
+
C111(e
∗
2, t2)γ
′
1(β¯)
2
C11(e∗2, t2)3
]
+ γ′′1 (β¯)e
∗
1 + γ
′′
2 (β¯)e
∗
2 − γ′′1 (β¯)e∗2 − γ′′2 (β¯)e∗1,
and the result follows.
B4. Predictive power under private information
In the case of private information, define the predictive power of the contest as
QS(β) =
∫
t1<t2
p(b1(t1; β), b2(t2; β); β)dF (t1, t2) (45)
+
∫
t1>t2
[1− p(b1(t1; β), b2(t2; β); β)]dF (t1, t2).
Here, bi(t; β) are the equilibrium bidding functions satisfying the system of integral equa-
tions (8).
The following proposition provides conditions under which predictive power QE(β)
has a local maximum or a local minimum at β = β¯.
Proposition B4 Suppose p has locally symmetric bias and the following condition holds
for all t1 < t2 in the support of F :
2
(
p11b
2
1(t1; β¯) + 2p12b1(t1; β¯)b1(t2; β¯) + p22b
2
1(t2; β¯) (46)
+2p1βb1β(t1; β¯) + 2p2βb2β(t2; β¯)
)
+ p1z(t1) + p2z(t2) + pββ − p˜ββ < 0.
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Here, all the derivatives of p are evaluated at (b1(t1; β¯), b1(t2; β¯); β¯); z(t) is the solution
of integral equation (43) in Proposition B2; and p˜ββ ≡ pββ(b1(t2; β¯), b1(t1; β¯); β¯).
Then QS(β) has a local maximum at β = β¯. If the inequality is reversed, S(β) has a
local minimum at β = β¯.
Proof. Differentiating the expression for QS(β) with respect to β twice and setting β = β¯,
obtain
QSββ(β¯) =
∫
t1<t2
[(p11b1β(t1; β¯) + p12b2β(t2; β¯) + 2p1β)b1β(t1; β¯) + p1b1ββ(t1; β¯)
+ (p12b1β(t1; β¯) + p22b2β(t2; β¯) + 2p2β)b2β(t2; β¯) + p2b2ββ(t2; β¯) + pββ]dF (t1, t2)
−
∫
t1>t2
[same expression]dF (t1, t2).
Recall that in equilibrium at β = β¯, with a locally symmetrically biased CSF, we have
b1(t; β¯) = b2(t; β¯), b1β(t; β¯) = −b2β(t; β¯), p11 = −p˜22, p12 = −p˜12, and p1β = p˜2β.
Swapping the variables of integration in the second integral and using the definition
z(t) = b1ββ(t; β¯) + b2ββ(t; β¯), obtain the result.
For a CSF that is linear in effort, (46) takes a simpler form, and the result is similar
to the case of public information.
Corollary 4 Corollary 3 holds in the case of private information, with e∗1 = b1(t1; β¯) and
e∗2 = b1(t2; β¯).
Proof. For a linear CSF p(e1, e2; β) = γ1(β)e1 + γ2(β)e2 + γ(β), Eqs. (32) become
γ′1(β)
∫
dF (t′|t) = C11(b1(t; β¯), t)b1β(t; β¯), −γ′2(β)
∫
dF (t′|t) = C11(b1(t; β¯), t)b2β(t; β¯),
which gives, assuming γ′1(β¯) = γ
′
2(β¯) due to the locally symmetric bias condition,
b1β(t; β¯) = −b2β(t; β¯) = γ
′
1(β¯)
C11(b1(t; β¯), t)
.
Furthermore, (43) gives
C11(b1(t; β¯), t)z(t) = −2C111(b1(t; β¯), t)b21β(t; β¯) + γ′′1 (β¯)− γ′′2 (β¯),
z(t) = −2C111(b1(t; β¯), t)γ
′
1(β¯)
2
C11(b1(t; β¯), t)3
+
γ′′1 (β¯)− γ′′2 (β¯)
C11(b1(t; β¯), t)
.
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The criterion from Proposition 46 is, in this case,
4γ′1(β¯)[b1β(t1; β¯) + b2β(t2; β¯)] + γ
′
1(β¯)[z(t1) + z(t2)] + [γ
′′
1 (β¯)− γ′′2 (β¯)][b1(t1; β¯)− b1(t2; β¯)].
Plugging in the expressions for biβ and z(·), obtain the same result as in Corollary 3.
The fact that Corollary 3 holds for both public and private information, with equilib-
rium efforts appropriately redefined, is not unexpected. When the CSF is linear in effort,
a player’s equilibrium effort depends only on her own type, and hence information about
the other player’s type is irrelevant.
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